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Abstract
This thesis explores fundamental improvements in unsupervised deep
learning algorithms. Taking a theoretical perspective on the purpose
of unsupervised learning, and choosing learnt approximate inference
in a jointly learnt directed generative model as the approach, the
main question is how existing implementations of this approach,
in particular auto-encoders, could be improved by simultaneously
rethinking the way they learn and the way they perform inference.
In such network architectures, the availability of two opposing
pathways, one for inference and one for generation, allows to exploit
the symmetry between them and to let either provide feedback signals
to the other. The signals can be used to determine helpful updates
for the connection weights from only locally available information,
removing the need for the conventional back-propagation path and
mitigating the issues associated with it. Moreover, feedback loops
can be added to the usual usual feed-forward network to improve
inference itself. The reciprocal connectivity between regions in the
brain’s neocortex provides inspiration for how the iterative revision
and verification of proposed interpretations could result in a fair
approximation to optimal Bayesian inference.
While extracting and combining underlying ideas from research in
deep learning and cortical functioning, this thesis walks through the
concepts of generative models, approximate inference, local learning
rules, target propagation, recirculation, lateral and biased competition,
predictive coding, iterative and amortised inference, and other related
topics, in an attempt to build up a complex of insights that could
provide direction to future research in unsupervised deep learning
methods.

Preface
My focus in the last year or so has been on how to enable computers
to perceive and interpret their sensory input and how to learn these
skills solely from passive observation. When starting to work on
this master’s thesis, it quickly became clear that my envisaged
approach to machine learning deviated so substantially from the
main-stream research, that satisfactorily working out the ideas to a
concrete implementation to experiment with would not be feasible
within the designated time-frame. In writing this thesis, my goal has
therefore been to compile my thoughts into a (more or less) coherent
essay, that would convey to the reader the insights that I have acquired
in my studies and would provide pointers to the sources that brought
me the inspiration.
Since master’s theses are notorious for never being read by anybody
but one’s supervisor (if even that), I have often imagined my target
audience to be my future self, seeking to again understand some
forgotten insights after having spent some years focussing on more
important problems. In the delusive hope of attracting other readers,
I have tried to avoid needlessly technical jargon and focus more on
intuitive explanations than mathematical derivations, to make the
writing relatively accessible and pursue the mission of inciting insight.
A few words of disavowal may be appropriate. While my writing
may frequently sound self-assured, I do not claim to fully understand
all the concepts that I write about. I do know that writing about them
made me understand them much better — trying to explain a topic
often reveals the holes in one’s understanding. However, some of
the thoughts and insights may turn out to be flawed, irrelevant, or
plainly wrong. Also, I do not claim any of the ideas to be novel. I
have copied and combined many ideas from other people, and every
thing I came up with has probably been around long before me. The
value in this writing is not intended to be in the introduction of ideas,
but in their compilation.
I conclude with some quick thanks, firstly to my supervisor Tapani
Raiko, who gave me so much freedom to follow my own interests
in unsupervised learning, that I started to call him my unsupervisor.
6Besides him, I thank Harri Valpola, Antti Rasmus, Jyri Kivinen, Aapo
Hyvärinen, and whomever else I forget to mention, for the valuable
discussions, tips and inspiration that helped shape my thoughts.
For whomever would like to use any parts of this work, please feel
free to do so. I publish this thesis into the public domain, free
from copyright restrictions. Note that this cannot imply a licence for
plagiarism — attribution and hyperlinks are appreciated. Also, please
leave a note if you find mistakes or have relevant comments. I would
be happy to hear if any piece of my writing has been of any value to
you.
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Introduction
Deep learning is a popular field of research nowadays, and its recent
achievements have pushed the boundaries of what computers are
capable of when it comes to tasks involving vision, speech recognition,
language translation, and other types of complex data processing. The
interesting aspect is that the algorithms are not specifically written
to perform those tasks, they are written to learn to perform those
tasks. Learning from experience may be the natural way of acquiring
behaviour for humans and other animals, but this has never been so
for computers.
Perhaps these techniques do not yet realise the long-fostered dream
of engineering general intelligence (whatever it exactly means), but
it would already be a great achievement if we can get computers to
mimic one ability of brain-based creatures: learning how to interpret
data by discovering the statistical structure in the previously observed
data. It is this challenge that will be focussed on in this thesis, where
we rely on the assumption that this can be done in ways that are not
specific to the type of data we are dealing with.
To learn to interpret data, most contemporary deep learning meth-
ods apply variations of the same recipe, back-propagation-powered
supervised learning. During the learning phase, a desired output
value is specified for every datum, and the network’s connection
strengths are modified to steer the output closer to that target value
for future input with similar values. This thesis however seeks to
advance another paradigm, that of unsupervised learning, which has
recently not kept up with the achievements of supervised learning,
but is widely expected to ultimately be more relevant:
“we expect unsupervised learning to become far more important in the
longer term. Human and animal learning is largely unsupervised: we
discover the structure of the world by observing it, not by being told
the name of every object.”1
1 Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and
Geoffrey Hinton (2015). Deep learning.
Nature, 521(7553):436–444
Of course there is also quite some research in unsupervised learning,
but it seems that popular approaches borrow strongly from the
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techniques developed for supervised learning, even though the
problem setting is substantially different. Auto-encoders and the
like, a prevalent unsupervised approach, basically apply a supervised
method to unlabelled data. Although this should not necessarily be
an issue, designing methods specifically for the unsupervised setting
would likely lead to better results. It seems that in auto-encoders
there is much potential for exploiting the symmetry between their
inference and generation side, which could be working together more
tightly.
My personal impression is that the modus operandi in our field is to
develop algorithms that we do not fully understand ourselves, but that
we can make work acceptably thanks to generic optimisation methods
and loads of computational power and training data. Regarding the
computational power, the recent breakthroughs of deep learning have
been attributed as much to the application of massive computational
(gpu) power as to the invention of better algorithms. For example,
Jürgen Schmidhuber writes the following about a record-breaking
result achieved with “good old on-line back-propagation”2:
2 Dan Claudiu Ciresan, Ueli Meier,
Luca Maria Gambardella, and Jürgen
Schmidhuber (2010). Deep, big,
simple neural nets for handwritten
digit recognition. Neural computation,
22(12):3207–3220
“Since BP was 3–5 decades old by then, and pattern deformations 2
decades, these results seemed to suggest that advances in exploiting
modern computing hardware were more important than advances in
algorithms.”3
3 Jürgen Schmidhuber (2015). Deep
learning in neural networks: An
overview. Neural Networks, 61:85–117
My hunch is that much better results could be obtained with more
sophisticated and less computation-hungry methods, but coming up
with fundamental improvements is difficult and may require going
back to the drawing board several times. It sometimes feels like most
research in the current deep learning hype is hunting for short-term
improvements in a small corner of the vast search space of possible
methods. The expectable result of such a process is to end up in a
local optimum.
Luckily, there are still plenty of ideas around for alternative deep
learning approaches, and this thesis builds on several of them. There
is a remarkable amount of theories of how the brain functions and
learns that have found only scant echo in machine learning research.
Similarly, there have been many inventions and experiments in
machine learning, but many are largely ignored or forgotten about.
The plan in this thesis is to explore some less conventional deep
learning approaches, draw inspiration from how the neocortex in
the brain is speculated to work, and try to fit several of these ideas
together. Although methods can be approached from many angles,
our main perspective is that we start from auto-encoders and try to
let the generation side provide feedback to the inference side. Rather
than converging to a concrete algorithm, the intent is to lay out the
lines of thought that lead to the outline of an unsupervised learning
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paradigm, and provide insights and guiding principles for future
research.
Before jumping in, a quick overview of what is ahead. The starting
point, chapter 1, presents the core concepts of deep unsupervised
learning, and the role generative models have in this. Chapter 2
reviews some well-known algorithms that implement these concepts,
and that will be built upon later. Basic brain anatomy and theories of
how it processes information are covered in chapter 3. The subsequent
two chapters will treat two different aspects of how unsupervised
deep learning could be improved: In chapter 4, we look at alternatives
to back-propagation, in particular at how the generation side and
inference side of auto-encoder-like networks could directly provide
learning signals for each other. In chapter 5, the main question is
how the inference process could be improved by using generation
in a feedback loop. Finally, the ideas of these two chapters are then
combined in the synthesis.

1Unsupervised learning — in concept
Unsupervised learning is the art of detecting predictable structure
in data, and is an essential capability of intelligent systems, be they
natural or artificial. It is this process that enables humans to perceive
objects and sceneries instead of flickering coloured dots, and words
and phrases instead of mere sound frequencies. It is the lack of this
process that renders a computer with microphone and camera still
effectively deaf-blind, and responding no more aptly after years of
duty than on its first day. Ameliorating the absolute stupidity of
computers is the driving motivation behind this thesis, and deep
neural networks are the assumed tool for the job.
The fundamental principle of unsupervised learning is that by
observing a stream of data, for example the images from a camera,
it is possible to derive a model of the relations between the data
variables (in this case the pixels). For each kind of data these relations
are different, and we will stick with natural images as our running
example. Images are not at all arbitrary pixel matrices, but contain
many often recurring systematicities or ‘patterns’. Even when given
no prior knowledge about the type of data, a learning algorithm
could quite easily discover that values of neighbouring pixels are
strongly correlated and that edges tend to continue. Subsequently,
the idea of deep learning is that the presences of such discovered
patterns can be found to be related among each other, leading to the
deduction of progressively more complex inter-variable relations or
‘higher level’ patterns: lines form certain shapes; eyes usually come
in pairs; penguins belong on ice.
In a neural network algorithm, the learning happens through the
adjustment of strengths of connections between simple functional
units, similar to neurons in the brain1. A dedicated set of input units
1 We will stick with this terminology:
brains have neurons, algorithms have
units.
provides the sensory input, and triggers the others to settle to a new
state of activation. Activations correspond to the detection of patterns,
so the unit activations collectively represent the interpretation of an
input datum. While the input units present just a matrix of pixels, the
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activations of units higher up express the image as a composition of
shapes, objects, sceneries and more abstract concepts. This capability
to learn to interpret data to is what we wish to achieve, because it is
crucial for intelligent behaviour.
1.1 Relation with supervised learning
The premise of unsupervised learning is that just observing the data
itself is sufficient to learn to interpret data, and for example learn to
recognise koalas and penguins in images simply from their occasional
appearances. This contrasts it with supervised learning, arguably the
more popular field nowadays, in which an algorithm would be taught
to distinguish the koalas and penguins by passing it the correct label
along with each picture. Although a practical method when desiring a
particular input-output mapping, purely supervised learning requires
lots of labelled training data and computation. Moreover, it results
in a rather inflexible system that is optimised for a single, fixed task,
and is unable to adapt to changes in the data during its application,
when labels are not available.
Unsupervised learning may overcome these issues of supervised
learning, since it requires no labels to learn from, and learns a generic
abstraction that should be usable for different tasks. But even though
an unsupervisedly trained network, assuming it is powerful enough,
may internally have learnt to distinguish koalas and penguins, it does
not provide this knowledge in a simple output value. Its interpretation
forms a distributed representation, consisting of possibly thousands of
variables whose individual meanings may be hard to understand or
use. The network could still be useful for tasks such as spotting
anomalies, estimating similarity, and perhaps filling up gaps in
data with sensible values, but often we desire it to specialise at
detecting and reporting particular patterns (e.g. pedestrian detection)
or producing a particular output (e.g. a translated sentence).
Unsupervised learning is therefore frequently used in combination
with other types of machine learning to steer its interpretations
towards what the task at hand requires. It is used to aid supervised
learning, either applied as ‘pre-training’ or fused together into a semi-
supervised algorithm, making the supervised learning task easier
and thereby reducing its need for large quantities of labelled data.
Likewise, aiding reinforcement learning could reduce the number of
actions required to learn fruitful behaviour.
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1.2 Learning representations
In order to aid subsequent learning tasks, the primary task of
an unsupervised learning algorithm is, at least as considered in
this thesis, to transform input data into a more useful, ‘high-level’
representation — a task also called representation learning. Basically,
usefulness is achieved when it is made easier to find relations between
the input variables and either target values (in supervised learning)
or actions and rewards (in reinforcement learning). For example,
learning how to discriminate koalas and penguins becomes much
easier when given variables representing properties like furriness and
wingedness instead of the original pixel colour values.
Although usefulness cannot be measured or even defined when the
subsequent task is left unspecified, the general desire is that in the
high-level representation the conceptual features implicitly present in
a datum are disentangled:
“the most robust approach to feature learning is to disentangle as many
factors as possible, discarding as little information about the data as is
practical.”2
2 Yoshua Bengio (2013). Deep learning
of representations: Looking forward.
In Statistical Language and Speech
Processing, pages 1–37. SpringerFor example, the colour of a boat can be considered a single feature,
perhaps representable in a single variable, while in the datum
it is spread out over many variables (pixels), which also contain
information about other features, like the shape, size and position of
the boat. Conversely, the representation should be largely invariant
to conceptually small changes in the datum. For example, changing
the boat’s colour or moving it in the image should have only a small
influence on its high-level representation.
The crucial question is how an algorithm can determine what are
those features that are to be disentangled, when given only a bunch
of apparently meaningless numeric vectors. The key is to reframe
the problem in terms of statistics and mutual information, and try to
formalise objectively measurable quantities that correspond as well
as possible to the intuitive notion of conceptual features. As a first
step, we can turn the above desire into two practical criteria:
1. The disentanglement turns the concepts into separate variables,
and should thereby also reduce the redundancy found in the datum.
A useful representation should have little redundancy, meaning
that its variables should show little statistical dependence3.
3 Note that these criteria are very
related to data compression, where
reducing redundancy leads to shorter
representations.
2. The representation should retain most information of the datum,
and not cover only a few features while ignoring the rest. This
implies that given only the representation, it should in theory be
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possible to adequately reconstruct the datum.
Satisfying these criteria does not guarantee that useful representations
are obtained. For example, desired high-level features might still
be somewhat dependent (perhaps larger boats tend to be red more
often), but the first criterion would disapprove this. These two criteria
could be modified or added to, but for now they provide a simple
and sensible basis to build upon.4 Often we will assume one more
4 See, for example, a theoretical treatise
by Brendan van Rooyen et al. (2015):
“We desire a feature map that provides a
compact representation of X, that looses
no information about X.” (sic, their
emphasis)
Brendan van Rooyen and Robert
Williamson (2015). A theory of feature
learning. arXiv:1504.00083
criterion, which desires the representations to be sparse in activity,
meaning that only a small portion of the variables has a non-zero
value. The idea of using sparse representations matches well with
the goal of disentangling concepts, since it can be assumed that each
datum contains only a few from the plethora of possibly occurring
concepts5.
5 See (Daniel Graham et al., 2006) for
a theory of why the brain also uses
sparse codes.
Daniel Graham and David Field
(2006). Sparse coding in the neocortex.
Evolution of nervous systems, 3:181–187
1.3 Learning by generation
The above criteria for good representations give a measure for the
end goal, but little concrete guidance for how to pursue it. Many
approaches have been developed that employ varying techniques to
satisfy the above, or similar, criteria. A great many of them involve,
in one way or another, a way to do the inverse of what we ultimately
wish to achieve: they learn a way to reconstruct a datum from its
representation. The intuition behind this is that in order to interpret
data and represent it in terms of high-level features, one needs to
understand how those high-level features manifest themselves in data:
“To recognize shapes, first learn to generate images”6
6 Geoffrey Hinton (2007b). To recognize
shapes, first learn to generate images.
Progress in brain research, 165:535–547
The previously still vague notion of ‘interpreting’ data now has gotten
a clear task description, and that is to infer the causes that would have
generated a datum when following the learnt model of generation7.
7 The causes in this generative model
may or may not correspond to the real
world causes of the datum, but the
causal structure of our universe does
provide a justification why directed
generative models are useful for
capturing the structure of our data.
In a sense, learning these rules is like searching for a better coordinate
system for the data, a bit like how latitude and longitude provide a
practical system to describe a spot on our three-dimensional globe.
The approaches investigated in this thesis learn a directed graphical
generative model of the data. The idea of such models is to hypoth-
esise the existence of latent variables, i.e. variables not observed in
the data, that serve as the causes from which the data variables are
assumed to have been generated. The values of the latent variables,
in the network implemented as the activations of the ‘hidden’ units,
influence the visible units through the downward connections, each
contributing a particular pattern to the generated value (details
follow next chapter). Learning proceeds by observing the data and
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finding a set of patterns that could have produced them as closely as
possible, while assuming that statistical interdependencies between
data variables are due to them having been influenced by the same
latent variables, which themselves are ideally independent. The model
thus learns patterns such that the latent variables satisfy both of the
above criteria, low redundance and reconstructibility, meaning that
they are closer to the conceptual features we wish to find and they
can serve as our new representation.
Since a single step from latent variables to data space is limited to
rather simple features, hierarchical generative models deepen the idea
by creating multiple layers of latent variables. The data is presented at
the bottom, and each next layer tries to model the variables in the layer
below itself. Through this sequence of several layers, patterns can
interact and complex transformations can be performed, so that the
higher layers can represent the data in terms of increasingly abstract
features.
“Deep architectures lead to abstract representations because more
abstract concepts can often be constructed in terms of less abstract
ones.”8
8 Yoshua Bengio (2013)
The first latent variable layer could for example learn to generate
short lines and edges in the pixel space, while the next layer learns to
command the first layer where to place those lines and edges to form
curves and shapes; and so on, up to penguins and koalas.
Although one could argue that a single layer model could also draw a
koala, the marvel of abstraction is that high-layer variables do not just
paint always the same pixel pattern onto the data canvas. Through
the non-linear interactions, a ‘koala variable’ can cause a koala to
be drawn in a pose and colour that is expressed by other variables.
Abstraction is the power of deep networks, and reason enough to call
other networks shallow. Note however, that the complexity created
by the multiple layers also makes that learning in a deep network is
much more difficult, and as we will now see, inference too.
1.4 Inference
The crucial remaining question is how exactly learning a generative
model will help us with our goal of interpreting data. Having
learnt how to generate items from high-level representations, in
theory interpreting a datum should be possible by checking which
representation would have generated it — in one word, by performing
inference. Interpretation thus becomes the act of inferring the causes
of the datum. Finding the best matching cause by trying all possible
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latent variable configurations is of course intractable, but ideally the
computation for generation is invertible and given a datum its causes
could easily be inferred. Unfortunately this is not the case, except
in very simple models. Multiple layers and non-linearities in the
generative model make that inference is much harder than generation,
and besides it is even ill-defined since multiple representations could
sometimes have generated the same result. Just learning a generative
model is therefore not sufficient to learn to interpret. In fact it is
not even practically possible, because, as we will see later (in 2.2.1),
learning the generative model actually involves doing inference.
The common solution is to learn a separate inference model, that
tries to approximately invert the generative model, and thus has its
connections pointing in the opposite direction:
“The role of the bottom-up connections is to enable the network to
determine activations for the features in each layer that constitute a
plausible explanation of how the network could have generated an
observed sensory data-vector.”9
9 Geoffrey E Hinton (2007). Learning
multiple layers of representation. Trends
in cognitive sciences, 11(10):428–434
The inference model is trained to produce representations that the
generative model would turn back into the corresponding data. And
vice versa, the generative model is trained to turn the representations
produced by the inference model back into the corresponding data.
Although it seems a chicken-and-egg problem10 when gradually
10 Geoffrey Hinton (2007b) again
phrases it aptly: So we have a chicken-
and-egg problem: Given the generative
weights we can learn the recognition
weights and given the recognition weights
we can learn the generative weights.”
learning starting from a random initialisation, together these two
models can attain a decent result11. This dual learning approach is
11 This may however take many
thousands of iterations, especially in
deep networks; we will come back to
this in section §4.6.
the basic idea of auto-encoders, a family of algorithms that will be
treated in the next chapter.
If we also have to learn an inference model anyway, we may ask
if we still need a generative model at all. However, without the
generative model we would be without guidance regarding which
features to learn, so it seems we still do, even if only to ensure that
useful representations are learnt. Learning the inference model could
be seen as the primary goal, while the generative model acts as a
constraint that ensures that the reconstructibility criterion is met.
Moreover, a premise of this thesis is that the generative model can be
more useful than just to guide learning of an inference model, so in
chapter 5 we will entwine the two models and investigate how their
combination can perform both tractable and powerful inference.
1.5 Probabilistic versus deterministic models
While up to now the models have been sketched quite generically,
unsupervised learning methods can often be approached through
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either of two paradigms: deterministically, meaning exact values
are computed for the variables, and probabilistically, where instead
variables are assigned probability distributions of possible values to
allow for uncertainty12. We will dive into the details later, but it may
12 Connections strengths could be
treated with uncertainty too, but we
will not go there.
be good to highlight the conceptual differences. Methods are often
classified as belonging to either paradigm, though the distinction
is partly a matter of perspective, and a probabilistic method can be
regarded as a probabilistic interpretation of an underlying deterministic
method — though possibly one that includes a noise source. Probabil-
ity theory gives a framework to think more abstractly about a problem,
so by first designing a generative model in probabilistic terms, and
then choosing how to turn it into a deterministic implementation that
approximates ideal inference and learning, the resulting algorithm
has an intuitive justification for what it does and can be more easily
adjusted and compared to other algorithms.
Probabilistic and deterministic approaches differ in how they regard
generation. In a deterministic generation process, such as the decoder
in a usual deep auto-encoder, each layer defines the exact value for
the layer below. In contrast, in a probabilistic generative model, a
value in one layer can for the layer below it produce any value from a
whole distribution of values. Typically it would first compute a single
expected value as would a deterministic model, and then deviate
from it by adding a particular amount of noise, to end up with a
value anywhere near the initial choice. When applying such variation
in several layers, the distributions interact and make that a single
representation at the top level can represent a complex distribution of
possible values at the bottom. Each high-level representation can thus
manifest itself in many ways, each manifestation having a different
probability to occur.
Besides each representation generating a distribution of resulting
values, a probabilistic generative model also defines a prior probability
distribution that specifies how likely each representation is to occur
itself. This solves the problem in inference that a datum could
often have been generated from any of several representations, since
inference can use the prior to assess how probable each possible cause
is.
Insight: Priors add some sense to computers, providing a way to choose
between technically correct (but possibly absurd) interpretations.
An important difference between deterministic and probabilistic
generation is the amount of detail that has to be defined a top-level
representation. In deterministic generation, the intermediate layers
and bottom layer consist of fully dependent variables, with their
values being uniquely determined by the top level representation13.
13 In the context of probabilistic models,
such fully dependent variables are not
even called variables at all.
The implication is that every detail in the generated item must already
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be represented in the high-level representation, and conversely, an
inference model cannot drop any details on the way up14. For
14 Harri Valpola (2014). From neural
PCA to deep unsupervised learning.
arXiv:1411.7783
example, even the change in the angle of a single straw in a picture of a
meadow must correspond to a change in the high-level representation
of that picture. This implication conflicts with our desire for a
representation consisting of abstract features, and it wastes a lot
of units to get all the details through the layers.
In a probabilistic model, each layer has freedom to pick from a set
of values, which allows the top layers to ignore details that can be
modelled in the lower layers. The top layers could command that
grass should be drawn, but a lower layer can pick the angle for each
straw. When performing inference, the lower layers can figure out and
remember the angles of the straws, and report upwards that they see
some grass. In a sense, the responsibility of representation is spread
out over the layers, and the value of the top layer alone cannot be
considered the full representation any more. The top level contains
the high-level, abstract representation, while the lower layers contain
the concrete details, together forming a deep representation.
Insight: Deep network 6= deep representation. A deterministic deep
network still produces flat representations if it is unable to leave details
in lower layers.
2Unsupervised learning — in algorithms
Many neural network based approaches to unsupervised learning
have been explored in roughly the last half-century. Earlier ex-
periments mainly aimed at testing hypotheses for the brain, while
later the focus diverged and getting interesting results became more
important than ‘neural plausibility’. Besides uses of unsupervised
learning for clustering and visualisation purposes, the unsupervised
learning of representations (also dubbed representation or feature
learning) gained popularity as a method for improving performance
in supervised learning tasks. Probabilistic approaches led to gen-
erative models, also called density models, which could be seen as
the extension of linear factor analysis, or even as supervised neural
networks with the unspecified inputs1. This chapter will treat in
1 David MacKay introduced density
networks as such: “This is a neural
network for which target outputs
are provided, but the inputs are
unspecified”
David MacKay (1995). Bayesian neural
networks and density networks. Nuclear
Instruments and Methods in Physics
Research, Section A, 354(1):73–80
more detail how the ideas from the previous chapter have been
implemented in various concrete algorithms. Note that it is not a
comprehensive overview of existing work, but rather covers a few
related methods that are relevant for the remainder of this thesis;
that is, those methods that employ some combination of an inference
model and a generative model.
2.1 Neural networks
First we quickly recap the basics of neural network algorithms. As
with perhaps any machine learning algorithm, there are two aspects
to it:
1. A configurable model that performs a computation on a datum.
2. A learning algorithm that configures the model to perform the
desired computation.
We will first look at the typical structure used in model architectures,
and then at the typical way to configure (learn) them.
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2.1.1 Typical network architecture
In the majority of contemporary approaches, a neural network
computation is based on some variation of what is called a multi-layer
perceptron network (mlp). Such a network involves layers of units,
in which the input of a unit is the weighted sum (weighted by the
learnt connection strength) of the activations units in the previous
layer, plus a constant bias2. This implies that the layer as a whole
2 The bias can also be negated to be
regarded as a threshold, and for clarity
it is often omitted in diagrams and
formulas
performs an affine transformation on the column vector formed by
the units previous layer, normally followed by an element-wise non-
linear function. A deterministic inference network with the input
layer x = h0 at the bottom and an output hL on top could be defined
like this:
hl = φl (Wlhl−1 + bl) (1 < l ≤ L)
In the most basic form (so basic it is often not even regarded as a
neural net), there is only one layer and no non-linearity (φ (x) = x).
This is the case with both generation and inference in pca and in
ica3, and with generation in sparse coding (described below). A
3 Principal and independent
component analysis are assumed
familiar; for a good introduction to
both, see (Aapo Hyvärinen et al.,
2009). In short, principal component
analysis rotates the data’s coordinate
system so that the first component
(latent variable) represents the
direction of largest variation in the
data, and likewise each subsequent
component explains as much of the
data’s remaining variance as possible.
More interesting in our context is
independent component analysis,
which finds components that have as
little dependence as possible among
each other. It is however limited in
this task by using only a single linear
transformation.
Aapo Hyvärinen, Jarmo Hurri, and
Patrick Hoyer (2009). Natural Image
Statistics: A Probabilistic Approach to
Early Computational Vision., volume 39.
Springer Science & Business Media
network’s computation becomes more powerful when multiple layers
with non-linearities are used. Commonly used non-linearities are
sigmoidal functions and rectified linear units (ReLU).
The patterns that units respond to or generate are defined through
the weights W of the connections (and the bias b), and the learning
process boils down to finding good values for those weights. Since
the problem is too complex to analytically determine optimal weight
values, the ubiquitous learning approach is to start from an initial
(perhaps randomised) guess, and update the weights gradually while
observing the data. The essential task of the learning algorithm is
to determine the update directions that make the overall network
perform a little bit better each time.
2.1.2 Optimisation and objective functions
Detached from the earlier neuroscience-based experiments, in which
hypothesised models of neuron populations would be simulated with
a chosen learning rule to see what patterns emerge, nowadays pretty
much all machine learning algorithms are based on optimising the
parameters of the model to make it better match a predefined objective.
The parameters of the model, usually denoted by the vector θ, are
essentially the connection weights W1 · · ·WL and biases b1 · · · bL of
the neural network, though sometimes other network properties are
learnt too. The objective is a function J (θ,X ), that evaluates how
well the network performs with the parameter configuration θ on a
data set X . Often the objective is defined via a cost function C, and
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J (θ,X ) = −C (θ,X ).
The optimisation is performed by some form of stochastic gradient
ascent (or descent with regard to the cost), which basically amounts
to iteratively computing the objective’s gradient (its derivatives with
respect to the parameters) on subsets of the data (mini-batches Xi),
and updating the model parameters a tiny step ∆θ in the direction
that locally satisfies the objective most:
∆θ = η
∂J (θ,Xi)
∂θ
θ ← θ + ∆θ
In practice, more sophisticated variations to this rule are used in order
to speed up the optimisation, for example by dynamically adjusting
the step size η, adding momentum, or using second order derivatives.
If the model is a multi-layer neural network, computing the gradient
involves back-propagating the partial derivatives through the layers,
which will be a topic of chapter 4.
Whereas in supervised learning the objective is basically to have
the network’s output match the desired output (e.g. class label)
for each of the training samples4, in unsupervised learning it is
4 Besides this main objective
regularisation penalties are often
added to prevent over-fitting the
model on the training data
not so obvious what to optimise for, and coming up with a good
optimisation objective is perhaps the crux of unsupervised learning.
In the deterministic case, the objective is normally defined in the
form of a cost or ‘energy’ function that is to be minimised. Often the
main term of such a cost function is the reconstruction error, which
ensures that the network can generate the datum from the inferred
representation. In probabilistic models, the objective function need
not be manually defined but instead follows automatically from the
form of the chosen probability distribution, as we will see shortly.
2.2 Probabilistic models
As discussed in section §1.5, we like to make abstractions around
deterministic neural networks and instead think in terms of proba-
bility distributions, which often leads to the invention of approaches
that we would not have come up with without this abstraction. Even
though they may under the hood employ the same kinds of neural
networks, probabilistic approaches may thus require quite a different
way of thinking.
The conventional way to formalise probabilistic directed genera-
tive models is to define a parametrised distribution p (X,H), with
p (x, h) = p (x|h) p (h)5. The prior p (h) is usually made factorisable
5 For brevity, sloppy notation is used,
e.g. p (x|h) means pθ (X = x|H = h).so that each unit has a individual prior, for example a Gaussian
(normal) or Laplace (sparse) distribution centered around zero. The
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conditional distribution p (X|h) defines which values can be generated
by a value h, which strongly depends on the setting of the parameters
θ, in our case the neural network connection weights. Instead of the
layer’s value x, the neural network now generates the parameters
for the conditional distribution. Most commonly, it generates the
expected value µ of a Gaussian distribution:
p (X|h) = N
(
µ (h) , σ2 I
)
To make the model hierarchical, technically speaking p (h) is turned
into a more complex distribution containing variables h1 · · · hL, while
p (x|h) only depends on h1. Explained more intuitively, each hl is
a layer of variables that can generate values for the layer below it,
together forming a chain of conditional distributions:
p (x|h) p (h) = p(x|h1)p(h1|h2) · · · p(hL−1|hL)p(hL)
Generating a single value can easily be done by ancestral sampling,
first sampling a value for the top level hL, then each level below it in
turn, down to the data space at the bottom. Note that each conditional
distribution p (hl |hl+1) could in principle contain multiple determin-
istic layers, so a network can mix probabilistic and deterministic
layers.
2.2.1 Learning
For probabilistic generative models, learning proceeds by trying to
make our data distribution p (x) as similar as possible to the data
we have been given. Traditionally there have been two common
approaches to quantify this similarity, which are actually equivalent.
The first is to measure how likely it would have been to end up with
the data set when drawing samples from the model distribution. The
objective function could thus be the ‘data likelihood’ of a data set X :
J (θ,X ) = p(X ) = ∏
x∈X
p (x)
In practice, to make computation simpler and turn the product into
a sum, the logarithm of this value is used instead. This is effectively
equivalent because the logarithm is a monotonic function, making that
the gradient will still point to the same direction, albeit with a different
magnitude. The usual objective is thus the data log-likelihood:
J (θ,X ) = log p(X ) = ∑
x∈X
log p (x) = E
x∼q log p (x)
The right-most expression is obtained by considering the data as
samples from a data distribution, named q(X), which is itself un-
known. Viewing the data as having originated from a probability
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distribution justifies the use of subsets (mini-batches) of the data to
approximate the expectation, instead of summing over the whole
data set. Also, it brings up the second approach, which is to
make the model distribution p(X) as similar as possible to q(X)
by trying to minimise the Kullback-Leibler divergence between them,
a dissimilarity measure for probability distributions:
KL(q||p) = E
x∼q log
q(x)
p(x)
= E
x∼q log q(x)− Ex∼q log p(x) = H(q)− Ex∼q log p (x)
Because the data entropy H(q) is constant and thus of no influence in
the gradient calculation, setting J (θ,X ) = −KL (q||p) is equivalent
to log-likelihood learning.
In either approach, the problem of choosing the objective function
is reduced to defining the probability distribution. However, one
big problem remains, because since our models define the dis-
tribution based on the latent variables, computing the marginal
p (x) = ∑h p (x|h) p(h) (or its gradient with respect to θ) for even
a single datum x is usually intractable, as it would require summing
over all possible values of h. To avoid the full summation, the idea
of the expectation–maximisation (em) algorithm6 can be applied:
6 Arthur Dempster, Nan Laird, and
Donald Rubin (1977). Maximum
likelihood from incomplete data
via the em algorithm. Journal of
the royal statistical society. Series B
(methodological), pages 1–38
for each datum, it is estimated which setting of the latent variables
would probably have caused it, and for some picked value(s) of
h the probability p (h, x) is increased by updating the parameters.
Estimating a probable value however means that we need to sample
from p (h|x)7, and it is for this reason that inference is required to
7 Ideally we would compute the whole
distribution, but sampling should give
an unbiased estimate to approximate
real em.
learn in a generative model8.
8 As was hinted in 1.4
2.2.2 Inference
Inference in a probabilistic generative model would ideally corre-
spond to the calculation of p (H|x), the probability distribution of
representations given a datum x, the calculation for which is derivable
through Bayes’ rule:
p (h|x) = p (x|h) p (h)
p (x)
=
p (x|h) p (h)
∑h p (x|h) p (h)
Because of the involved summation over all representations, this is
usually intractable. Luckily, it often suffices to either be able to draw
samples from this distribution, or to compute only the single most
probable representation. As these require only relative probabilities,
the p (x) can be dropped from the equation above. The single most
probable interpretation, or maximum a posteriori (map) inference,
thus becomes:
hˆ = argmax
h
p (h|x) = argmax
h
p (x|h) p (h)
p (x)
= argmax
h
p (x|h) p (h)
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Or, described in words, we search for the representation hˆ that
would be most likely to both occur itself and generate datum x.
Unfortunately, searching hˆ through this optimisation process is still
too hard in any but the simplest models. As mentioned in 1.4, many
methods avoid trying to compute p (H|x) altogether, and instead
go for a variational approach by trying to approximate p (H|x) with
an inference model, which is a separate neural network aligned in
the opposing direction that learns a probability distribution q (H|x)9.
9 Note that the same letter q is used
again on purpose, and the data
distribution q (X) can sensibly be
considered the prior of the inference
model.
This is the idea behind for example the variational auto-encoder
(vae), treated further below, and to some extent the idea can be found
behind auto-encoders in general.
An important implication is that because the approximate inference
model q (H|x) is also used to replace the intractable p (H|x) when
learning the generative model, any imperfection of the approximation
may partly be compensated for by the generative model. If the
inference model produces wrong values of h given some x, the
generative model will automatically adapt by learning to generate
that x from that h, thereby effectuating that the inference model is
more accurate again. The downside of this adaptation is that the
generative model will be suboptimal and cannot become better than
the approximate inference allows it to.
Insight: q restrains p. Learning of a generative model is restrained by
the quality of the inference model in use.
2.3 Auto-encoders
In an auto-encoder, a generative model is sided by an inference
model, which provides the values h from which the generative model
then learns to generate the original value x. Although we have
just covered these ideas in a probabilistic framework, most auto-
encoders lack a probabilistic interpretation, and words like inference
and generation are replaced by more the technical terms encoding
and decoding. Nevertheless, at least intuitively we can regard the
decoder as a generative process and the encoder as an approximation
to inference. Further down we will look at the more recent variational
auto-encoder, which introduces a method that makes the connection
between deterministic auto-encoders and probabilistic generative
models.
2.3.1 Basic auto-encoder
An auto-encoder learns a matching pair of functions: an encoder
f , which transforms a given data sample (a vector x ∈ Rd0) into its
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new representation (hL ∈ RdL ), and a decoder g, which turns such
a representation hL into a reconstruction xˆ ∈ Rd0 . Both functions
are implemented as neural networks. In the classical auto-encoder
both consist of a single affine transformation, in the encoder possibly
followed by a sigmoidal activation function. When either side has
multiple layers (and non-linearities) the thing is dubbed a deep auto-
encoder.
The encoder and decoder are trained together to ideally become each
other’s inverses for data samples. Put differently, for any x from the
data, we desire g( f (x)) = x. This is pursued by choosing an objective
function that penalises any deviations from this equality. Taking
squared vector distance to measure the error in the reconstruction of
the input, the basic auto-encoder cost function is:
Cerror = ∑
x∈Xi
‖x− g ( f (x))‖2
Seen in another way, supervised learning is being performed on the
mlp formed by the combination g · f , while the target value is simply
the input value itself. Commonly the decoder and encoder are given
same (but flipped) shape in terms of depth and layer sizes. The
weights of the encoder and decoder can be tied to be each other’s
transposes, which often speeds up initial learning but limits their
ability to fine-tune.
Some care needs to be taken to make the auto-encoder learn useful
representations of the data. Because only the criterion of recon-
structibility is taken into account in the above cost function, it could
end up with for example an identity mapping ( f (x) = x, g (h) = h),
which satisfies the cost function, but not our actual goal. The
original way to overcome such trivial solutions is to simply make
h of smaller dimensionality than x (dL < d0), so that it needs to
learn how to compress and decompress the data, thereby reducing
redundancy. However, this limitation of representation dimension
is often undesirable, as it may be useful to have representations
with a much larger dimensionality than the input data in order to
disentangle many concepts.
To tackle the problem of ending up with trivial or absurd models,
many variations to the basic auto-encoder have been developed, each
effecting some form of regularisation.
2.3.2 Denoising auto-encoder
One approach at auto-encoder regularisation that is worth a quick
mention is the principle of the denoising auto-encoder 10. The method
10 Pascal Vincent, Hugo Larochelle,
Yoshua Bengio, and Pierre-Antoine
Manzagol (2008a). Extracting and
composing robust features with
denoising autoencoders. In Proceedings
of the 25th international conference on
Machine, pages 1096–1103. ACM
is like the standard, deterministic (deep) auto-encoder, except that
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during training, the input data is partially corrupted before being
passed into the encoder. The target value is uncorrupted, so the
auto-encoder needs to learn how to turn corrupted data back into
the original data. Thereby it learns not a function that reconstructs
observed data as well as possible, but one that changes its input it
towards values that are more probable in the data set. In other words,
it ideally learns to compute derivative of the data distribution11:
11 Guillaume Alain and Yoshua
Bengio (2014). What regularized
auto-encoders learn from the data-
generating distribution. The Journal of
Machine Learning Research, 15(1):3563–
3593
g ( f (x)) = x+
∂q (x)
∂x
Because the auto-encoder tries to be insensitive to noise in the input, it
has to learn to exploit structure in the data to extract the information
from noisy signals, and create representations that are minimally
influenced by the noise. This last concept is also the idea behind
contractive auto-encoders, which instead of adding noise explicitly
calculate the derivative
∂ f (x)
∂x of the representation to the input and
add a penalty to the cost function to minimise it.
2.3.3 Sparse auto-encoder
Another approach to auto-encoder regularisation is to put extra con-
straints on the representation. In sparse auto-encoders, the variables
in the representation are penalised when taking too many non-zero
values, thereby encouraging the auto-encoder to find representations
that have many values at or close to zero. The trick is implemented
by adding a sparsity penalty to the cost function, for example using
the absolute values of the hidden unit activations:12
12 I use the notation h[i] to mean the
ith element of h, because subscripts
already indicate layer numbers.Ctotal = Cerror + Csparse = Cerror + λ∑
i
|hL[i]|
Here λ is a hyperparameter13 used to trade off reconstruction accuracy
13 A hyperparameter is a parameter
that is not updated by the learning
algorithm, and often tweaked
manually.
and representation sparsity. Because of the regularisation constraint,
a sparse auto-encoder can have as many or more hidden units than
input units without ending up learning a trivial solution.
A point to note is that not all representations necessarily become
sparse. Especially for data outside the training set, the encoder can
equally happily produce dense representations, because only during
training the sparsity is encouraged. To not confuse the decoder, it may
be beneficial to enforce the sparsity of representations when using
the trained network, by reducing the activity of representations that
exceed some threshold14. More rigorously, sparsity could be enforced
14 Kyunghyun Cho (2013). Simple
sparsification improves sparse
denoising autoencoders in denoising
highly corrupted images. In Proceedings
of the 30th International Conference on
Machine Learning (ICML-13), pages
432–440
by the network also during training, replacing the need for a training
penalty15. This idea leads to a broader insight:
15 k-Sparse auto-encoders do this,
though there it actually proved
better to enforce sparsity only during
training
Alireza Makhzani and Brendan
Frey (2013). k-sparse autoencoders.
arXiv:1312.5663
Insight: Encouragement versus enforcement. Regularisation penalties
can be substituted by architectural measures, which may help to
improve training and/or to generalise better afterwards.
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2.4 Sparse coding
Sparse coding16 is a technique that, similar to sparse auto-encoders,
16 Bruno Olshausen et al. (1996).
Emergence of simple-cell receptive
field properties by learning a sparse
code for natural images. Nature,
381(6583):607–609
learns to create sparse representations. Different from sparse auto-
encoders, it only defines the generative side, or decoder, which
is in this case simply a linear transformation by a matrix A17.
17 The letter A rather than W is
conventional here.
Although originally defined in a purely deterministic way, the method
appeared to be interpretable as a probabilistic model. Because a good
understanding of the model is helpful for grasping the methods
covered later in this thesis, we cover both explanations and show the
equivalence.
2.4.1 Deterministic definition
Lacking an explicit encoder, the representation of a data vector x is
implicitly defined as the vector h that is both sparse and accurately
generates x when h is passed through the decoder:
h = f (x) = argmin
h⋆
{
‖x− Ah⋆‖2 + λ∑
i
|h⋆[i]|
}
(2.1)
Again, there is a trade-off choice between accuracy and sparsity.
Lacking an encoder, the inference is performed by an optimisation
algorithm, that searches for the best value h given the current matrix
A and an input x. Instead of gradient-based optimisation as normally
used in parameter learning, orthogonal matching pursuit is often
used, which exploits the expected sparsity by starting from an all-zero
representation and one by one activating latent variables that give the
biggest step towards the objective18. The generative model is learnt
18 Kyunghyun Cho (2014). Foundations
and Advances in Deep Learning. PhD
thesis, Aalto University
by, after having inferred a value h, updating the matrix A towards
exactly the same objective of minimising ‖x− Ah‖2+λ∑i |h[i]|, while
regarding h constant.
Although the iterative inference process can be significantly more
expensive than having an explicit encoder network, it performs more
powerful inference as it ensures that h generates x.19
19 In section §5.5.1, we will treat this in
depth.
2.4.2 Probabilistic interpretation
As was already mentioned, sparse coding can be interpreted proba-
bilistically, and then appears to perform map inference on a probabilis-
tic generative model. This model has a Laplacian prior distribution
on the hidden layer h, in which values near zero are much more likely
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than larger values.
p (H) = Laplace
(
µ = 0, b =
1
λ
)
p (h) = ∏
i
λ
2
e−λ|h[i]|
The conditional distribution for generating a value x from a chosen
h is a multivariate Gaussian around the computed expected value
µ (h) = Ah, with each variable being independent from its peers and
having variance σ2 = 1/2.
p (X|h) = N
(
µ = Ah, Σ =
1
2
I
)
p (x|h) = ∏
i
1√
π
e−(x−Ah)[i]
2
Deriving map inference in this model shows the equivalence with the
original definition in equation 2.1:
hˆ = argmax
h
p (h|x)
= argmax
h
p (x|h) p (h)
= argmax
h
{log p (x|h) + log p (h)} (2.2)
= argmax
h
{
∑
i
− (x− Ah)[i]2 + ∑
i
−λ |h[i]|+ constants
}
= argmin
h
{
‖x− Ah‖ 2 + λ∑
i
|h[i]|
}
Learning in this probabilistic generative model should ideally
be done by tweaking the parameters (just the matrix A in
this case) to maximise the data log-likelihood Ex∼q log p (x) =
Ex∼q log (∑h p (x, h)). The sparse coding learning procedure instead
optimises Ex∼q log p
(
x, hˆ
)
, and can be regarded as a lower-bound
approximation that uses the map value of h rather than all h or
samples from its conditional distribution p (h|x).
Having interpreted sparse coding probabilistically, we may view the
sparse auto-encoder as nearly the same model, with the difference that
it employs one more approximation, by replacing the map inference
process with a parametrised inference model that is learnt alongside
the generative model. Note however, that because inference is used
during learning, replacing the inference procedure also influences the
generative model that is learnt20. An interesting hybrid between the
20 See insight “q restrains p”, §2.2.2.
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auto-encoder and sparse coding is predictive sparse decomposition, in
which an encoder is used to provide a starting point for (and thereby
speed up) the optimisation process of the inference21.
21 Koray Kavukcuoglu, Marc’Aurelio
Ranzato, and Yann LeCun (2010). Fast
inference in sparse coding algorithms
with applications to object recognition.
arXiv:1010.34672.5 Variational auto-encoders
The variational auto-encoder (vae)22 makes a clear connection be-
22 Diederik Kingma and Max Welling
(2013). Auto-encoding variational bayes.
arXiv:1312.6114
tween the various kinds of deterministic auto-encoders of section §2.3
and the variational methods of probabilistic generative models of
section §2.2, the latter of which involved using an inference model
q (h|x) that should approximate the intractable p (h|x) to learn a
generative model p (x|h) p (h). Whereas with the deterministic auto-
encoders we had to use quite some imagination to interpret them
as approximations to generative models and inference, the vae
is built with a probabilistic foundation, from which a practical
implementation is derived that is quite similar to an auto-encoder.
The vae learns by maximising, for each datum x, the not the log-
likelihood logp(x) directly, but a related objective L:
L = E
h∼q(h|x)
{− log q (h|x) + log p (h, x)} (2.3)
= −DKL (q (H|x) ‖p (H)) + E
h∼q(H|x)
log p (x|h) (2.4)
This objective is a lower bound to the data log-likelihood: log p (x) ≥
L. More precisely, the discrepancy between the two is the Kullback-
Leibler divergence between q(h|x) and p(h|x):23
23 Diederik Kingma et al. 2013, eq. 1
log p (x) = DKL (q (H|x) ‖p (H|x)) + L
So as long as the inference model q adequately approximates inference
in the generative model p, L is a fair substitute for the intractable
log-likelihood log p (x).
To estimate the expectation in 2.3 or 2.4, the expected value over
q(H|x) is approximated by sampling some values of h from q (H|x),
and in fact even a single sample may suffice, which we will assume
here24. This gives the approximation L˜:25
24 Diederik Kingma et al. (2013) found
that “the number samples L per data point
can be set to 1 as long as the mini-batch
size M was large enough”. Furthermore,
the learning may be improved by
taking several samples and weighting
the samples by their quality based on
p (x, h) (Yuri Burda et al., 2015).
25 Diederik Kingma et al. 2013, eq. 7
L˜ = −DKL (q (H|x) ‖p (H)) + log p (x|h)
The first term can be considered a regularisation that tries to make
the inference model’s posterior match the generative model’s prior.
The second term attempts to increase the probability that the inferred
h would generate the datum x. Although this term would seem to
only affect the weights of the generative model (because h is a fixed
sample), the interesting trick that makes the method very similar to
deterministic auto-encoders is to reparametrise the inference model
q (H|x) so that the distribution is expressed as a deterministic function
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g (ǫ, x) (including the neural network) of a fixed noise distribution
p (ǫ)26. This way sampling h ∼ q (H|x) can be done by first sampling
26 We use the paper’s notation of g and
p (ǫ) here, do not confuse the letters
with their other usages.
ǫ ∼ p (ǫ) and then computing h = g (ǫ, x) to transform the noise
sample to become a sample of q (H|x). Now the objective L˜ can
be maximised not only by tweaking the generative model turn h
into x, but also by tweaking the inference model (by tweaking the
mapping g) to produce a value h that would more likely generate x.
This is very much the learning principle of an auto-encoder, since
both the inference model (encoder) and generative model (decoder)
weights are updated simultaneously and by the same objective of
reconstructing the input.
To illustrate the relatedness with a simple example, consider the
case where q (h|x) = N
(
µq (x) , diag
(
σq (x)
2
))
, i.e. a factorisable
Gaussian distribution that computes it distribution parameters µq (x)
and σq (x) with perhaps an mlp. Similarly p (x|h) is a Gaussian with
µp (h), but we fix its variance to Σ = σ2p I. We actually need not define
the prior p (h) now, as it would only influence how the representations
are regularised. The inference model q can be reparametrised by
setting the noise distribution p (ǫ) to be a standard Gaussian, and
g (ǫ, x) = µq (x) + σq (x)⊙ ǫ 27. Now the ‘reconstruction’ term of the 27 The ⊙ means element-wise
multiplicationobjective L˜ becomes:
log p (x|h) ∝
(
x− µp (h)
)2
σ2p
=
(
x− µp
(
µq (x) + σq (x)⊙ ǫ
))2
σ2p
This part of the learning objective clearly resembles the squared-
error reconstruction cost of a deterministic auto-encoder, where µp
would be the decoder and µq the encoder, except that it adds a
learnable and data-dependent amount of noise to the representation
h; it could reasonably be considered a denoising auto-encoder that
adds the noise to the representation instead of to the input. This
example shows a very simple case, but a nice property of the vae is
that because it provides a probabilistic derivation, the optimisation
objectives automatically follow after having defined the probability
distributions.
3Unsupervised learning — in brains
In the way the wings of birds have inspired people to invent flying
machines, the brain is the source of inspiration for crafting intelligent
machines. It is safe to claim that had brains not existed, the idea
that intelligence is possible would not even have come up. However,
aeroplanes do not flap their wings even though birds do, and likewise,
artificial intelligence need not copy the way brains work. Nevertheless,
after more than half a century of fervent tinkering, neither classical,
rule-based ai nor connectionistic approaches (neural networks) have
achieved the expected progress towards basic intelligence, so it seems
that a lot may still be gained from investigating the principles applied
by the brain, as it does some things right.
This chapter will cover some basics of brain anatomy, focussing
on theories about how brains appear to implement unsupervised
learning. In particular we focus on the use of generation or prediction
in the neocortex, the principles of which will form the basis of the
ideas covered in the remainder of this thesis.
3.1 The neocortex
The mammalian neocortex, often just called cortex, is the main source
of inspiration for many deep learning enthusiasts. Compared to other
brain parts, it is considered a more recent invention of evolution,
and with its relatively large size in primates and especially humans
(constituting nearly 80% of our brain1) it has been credited with being
1 Henry Markram, Maria Toledo-
Rodriguez, Yun Wang, Anirudh Gupta,
Gilad Silberberg, and Caizhi Wu
(2004). Interneurons of the neocortical
inhibitory system. Nature Reviews
Neuroscience, 5(10):793–807
the engine of higher intelligence. It receives input from the senses
via the thalamus, controls voluntary motor activity, and encompasses
many of the complex processes that happen in between. Although
the cortex continuously interacts with other brain parts and studying
it in isolation may prove unavailing, it may be a good starting point
to look at its anatomy.
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Physically, the cortex consists of the outer sheet of both halves of the
cerebrum.
layer 1
layer 2/3
layer 4
layer 5
layer 6
Figure 3.1: A Golgi-stained
cut-through of the cortex of
an infant, with approximate
indication of layer locations.
Adapted from Santiago
Ramón y Cajal (1899).
The sheet is about 2 to 3 millimeters thick, containing in the order
of 100 000 neurons per square millimeter2. Radially the neurons
2 David Mumford (1991). On the
computational architecture of the
neocortex: I. The role of the thalamo-
cortical loop. Biological cybernetics,
65(2):135–145
are arranged in layers3 with different properties and connectivity.
3 Not to be confused with layers in
artificial neural networks.
Most layers contain many lateral connections between the neurons
in the same layer, and neurons have their dendrites (the tree of
input collectors) and axons (the output tentacle) sprout up and
down to connect to neurons in other layers. Usually, following the
numbering by Korbinian Brodmann dating from 19094, six layers are
4 Wikipedia (2015). Brodmann area —
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
distinguished:
• Layer 1 contains hardly any neuron bodies, but seems to host a
networking party for axons and dendrites from the other layers.
• Layer 2 and 3 are rather similar and in many analyses taken
together. They connect intensively laterally in patchy patterns,
and their activation is quite sparse5.
5 Henry Markram et al. (2004)
• Layer 4, called the granular layer, receives input from the thalamus
or another cortical region, and unidirectionally relays to layer 36.
6 Stewart Shipp (2007). Structure and
function of the cerebral cortex. Current
Biology, 17(12):R443–R449
• Layer 5 seems a sort of output layer. It engages in motor control,
sending outputs down to for example the spinal cord, as well as to
the thalamus.
• Layer 6 is not intensively integrated locally, but mostly involved in
communication with other cortical areas, as well as forming loops
with the thalamus.
Disregarding minor deviations in some cortical areas, this layer
structure appears all over the cortex. The column (through all six
layers) of neurons located at roughly the same spot on the sheet are
closely related in function, so rather than thinking about individual
neurons, it seems more appropriate to regard a column of neurons
as the primary computational unit, a so-called canonical microcircuit.
This is not unlike how digital electronics can better be analysed in
terms of logic gates (the micro-circuit) than transistors, although the
boundaries and function of the grouping are in the neural case not
agreed upon 7. Columns with related processing functions (perhaps
7 Jonathan Horton and Daniel Adams
(2005). The cortical column: a structure
without a function. Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences, 360(1456):837–862
detecting similar features) are often located closer together and are
heavily interconnected, forming fuzzy, cooperating assemblies8.
8 Kenneth Harris and Thomas Mrsic-
Flogel (2013). Cortical connectivity and
sensory coding. Nature, 503(7474):51–
58
Besides the described pyramidal or primary neurons, about 20%–30%
of neurons is made up of various forms of interneurons9, which
9 Henry Markram et al. (2004)
connect only locally and most of which are inhibitory, meaning
their activation discourages activation in the neurons they project
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to (analogous to negative weights). Some types of interneurons con-
nect unspecifically to any surrounding neurons, thereby apparently
measuring and controlling average activity, creating sparsity through
competition. As nearby columns commonly have correlated activity,
such inhibition could help to decorrelate signals10.
10 Thomas Cleland and Christiane
Linster (2012). On-center/inhibitory-
surround decorrelation via
intraglomerular inhibition in the
olfactory bulb glomerular layer.
Frontiers in integrative neuroscience, 6
On a larger scale, the cortical sheet can be segmented into several
dozen regions or areas, having on average about 100 million neurons11
11 David Mumford (1992). On the
computational architecture of the
neocortex: II. The role of cortico-
cortical loops. Biological cybernetics,
66(3):241–251
that collectively process a multitude of related signals. The regions are
richly interconnected, with each other as well as with subcortical brain
parts such as the thalamus. Especially in regions topologically close
to the senses, the connectivity between regions follows a hierarchical
structure, which can perhaps best be studied by taking an example.
3.2 The visual cortex hierarchy
By far the best studied group of regions is the visual cortex, located in
the back of the head, and comprising roughly 32 regions in primates12.
12 Daniel Felleman and David
Van Essen (1991). Distributed
hierarchical processing in the primate
cerebral cortex. Cerebral cortex, 1(1):1–
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The primary visual cortex region, shortly V1, receives signals coming
from the eyes (after some preprocessing outside the cortex), and
its columns appear to be sensitive to the presence of features like
edges and dots in different locations of the visual field13. The region
13 David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel
(1962). Receptive fields, binocular
interaction and functional architecture
in the cat’s visual cortex. The Journal of
physiology, 160(1):106
is strongly connected with an adjacent region, V2, which receives
the signals from V1, responds to more complex features, and in
turn connects to subsequent regions. Each region in fact connects
to many others — roughly a third of possible pairs of regions are
connected14 — and the topology elicits a richly connected hierarchical
14 Daniel Felleman et al. (1991)
structure. The hierarchy processes and combines inputs from the
senses in a gradual fashion, with the neurons in ‘higher’ regions
(topologically further away from the senses) dealing with input from
a larger receptive field and reacting to more complex features than
the lower ones; a discovery that has provided substantial inspiration
for the development of deep learning methods (where confusingly
the analogue of a region is called a layer).
The connectivity between subsequent regions is reciprocal but asym-
metric, with the ascending and descending pathways each connecting
from and to different cortical layers. Although there are many
exceptions to every discovered systematicity, there appear to be
general rules or at least tendencies in the connectivity, and studying
these typical connection patterns may give valuable clues about the
computation being performed.
In each region, layer 4 appears to serve as the main entrance for
ascending signals, which originate from layer 3 in the preceding
region. In V1, having no predecessor, layer 4 receives visual signals
from the retina, via the lateral geniculate nucleus (lgn) inside the
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thalamus. Inside the region, layer 4 passes signals to layer 3, thus
paving a two-step path for ascending through a region15. In addition
15 Stewart Shipp (2007)
to connections within the cortex, subcortical loops also contribute
to the ascending pathway. Outputs from layer 5 drive higher order
relays in the pulvinar thalamus, which in turn connect mainly to layer
3 of the subsequent region16,17.
16 ibid.
17 S. Murray Sherman and R. W.
Guillery (2002). The role of the
thalamus in the flow of information to
the cortex. Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
357(1428):1695–1708
Descending connections mainly originate from layer 6 and 5, to
terminate in layer 1 and 6 in the lower region. Between regions
close to each other in the hierarchy, the general rules are adhered to
less strictly18, and in particular extra descending paths connect from
18 Stewart Shipp (2007)
layer 2/3 to 1 and 619. Remarkably, taken together the descending
19 David Mumford (1992)
connections outnumber the ascending connections by an order of
magnitude. Their influence is more often modulatory20, meaning
20 Daniel Felleman et al. (1991)that they do not trigger any activity, but rather modify how neurons
respond to driving signals, e.g. amplifying or inhibiting their activity.
3.3 Unification theories
The hierarchical connectivity of cortical regions appears not only in
visual processing areas, but is similar for every sensory modality,
and to some degree also continues into the higher-level, non-sensory
regions. Seeing pretty much the same structure of regions, layers and
columns of neurons repeat all over the cortical sheet, it seems that the
cortex uses a single type of computation for tasks as diverse as vision,
audition and language.
The physical similarity in structure can however not suffice as
evidence, because of course the exact connectivity determines the
performed computation. By analogy, different digital circuits can look
similarly homogeneous, with straight rows of transistors forming
standard cells, but perform completely different computations. A
stronger support for the universality of the cortex is its neuroplasticity,
the ability of cortical areas to adopt different functions. For example,
primary auditory cortex (A1) can learn to process vision and becomes
somewhat like V1 when the nerves from the eyes are rewired to
replace those from the ears21. To a certain degree, the cortical areas
21 Jitendra Sharma, Alessandra
Angelucci, and Mriganka Sur (2000).
Induction of visual orientation
modules in auditory cortex. Nature,
404(6780):841–847
thus appear to be configured by the signals they receive, and learn to
process whichever kind of input is passed to them.
This property of the cortex matches exactly with what we are trying
to achieve with unsupervised learning: given a stream of data, the
machine should reconfigure itself and learn how to make sense out
of that kind of data. The neocortex can thus be said to perform
unsupervised learning, and the most intriguing question is then what
wizardly computation the cortex performs in its regions and column
micro-circuits. Unfortunately, despite a long-standing interest, quite
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little is understood about the computation it implements. Single
neurons have been studied, and the functional areas have been
mapped roughly, but the nature of its computation remains largely a
mystery.
Ideally, we would come up with a high-level description of a com-
putational design, which the neural structures we observe could be
implementing. Like with machine learning algorithms, the task of
cortex could be divided into two processes happening at different
time scales: firstly the way in which the cortex processes given input,
and secondly the way it reconfigures itself to learn how to process
future input. Preferably, the design we come up with would have
justifiable statistical or information-theoretic interpretation, covering
both the inference and the learning aspect, and giving an explanation
regarding why the particular computation is performed.
Of course, the task of cortex is much more varied than the learning
of abstract representations we discussed earlier, not the least because
it also involves actions like motor control and decision making. This
may complicate the picture when we are mostly interested in the
more passive functionality, but hopefully it does not prevent us from
drawing inspiration from the neocortex for our current purposes.
Even better, study of the cortex may ultimately provide hints for
how to weave action taking and reinforcement learning into our
algorithms.
3.4 Generative brains
Perhaps the most counter-intuitive finding in brain research is the
massive amount of feedback connections, making that each pair of
regions is connected reciprocally. This fact is at odds with the intuitive
idea that signals should mainly flow forward, from the senses to the
higher levels. Several theories propose that the descending pathway
in one way or another implements a generative process, so that the
brain learns not only to interpret sensory input, but also to construct
possible sensory experiences from higher-level ideas. Conveniently,
such an explanation would also provide a clue about the origins of
dreams, imagination and hallucinations.
Unsupervised learning in the cortex could thus involve learning a
hierarchical generative model, following the principles discussed in
the first chapter. It would however be different from the machine
learning algorithms, like those described in chapter 2, whose opti-
misation procedures, to begin with, seem not to match learning in
the cortex. To adapt the synaptic strengths without access to a global
objective’s gradient, perhaps the descending pathway plays a direct
role in learning of the ascending path, and vice versa. The application
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of this idea in machine learning will be explored in the next chapter.
More interestingly still, there are many signs that the cortex applies
generation more extensively than just to facilitate learning of an
inference model, suggesting rather that generation is an intrinsic part
of inference. We will now review some influential theories that gave
rise to and support this hypothesis, to look at applications of this idea
in machine learning further on, in chapter 5.
3.4.1 Predictive brain hypotheses
A whole branch of theories hypothesise that the brain has an ac-
tive role in processing its input, so that perception is largely an
act of generation and prediction, rather than merely transforming
incoming signals in a feed-forward manner. This school of thought
got reasonable attention and development in the last few decades,
although historical credit is often given to Hermann von Helmholtz,
who already in the 1860s realised that perception is a result of an
observer’s expectations as well as the sensory input22. Although a
22 Hermann von Helmholtz (1867).
Handbuch der physiologischen Optik.
Voss
controversial idea at that time, the role of prediction in the brain
gained significant research attention later on.23
23 Note that besides foretelling
future input, in this context
prediction/expectation also includes
‘spatial’ prediction: expecting variables
to have certain values based on values
of other variables.
One contemporary researcher active in this theme is Stephen Gross-
berg, who has argued that a feedback system is required to explain
observed psychological phenomena such as the overshadowing effect
in conditioning24,25. In his adaptive resonance theory, sensory signals
24 Stephen Grossberg (1980). How
does a brain build a cognitive code.
Psychological Review, pages 1–51
25 The overshadowing effect appears
when a subject is conditioned to
expect e.g. a shock when hearing a
tone. When subsequently the tone is
consistently accompanied by a flash
of light, the subject will afterwards
not fear the flash when it is given
separately. If the initial conditioning of
tone→shock would have been omitted,
presenting either a flash or tone would
elicit a response of fear, suggesting
that the brain compares its input to its
expectations. See (Stephen Grossberg,
1980, sec. 2)
flow forward to invoke an initial interpretation in the higher level,
which then produces a template (learnt from previous experiences)
of the activity it expects in the level below. The lower level of cells
receives this template, and emits a special signal if its values did not
match the expectation, upon which the active higher level’s active
cells would be muted to allow an alternative interpretation to emerge.
This process thereby performs error correction, and the essence of the
design is that by using learnt feedback expectancies, coding errors
(wrong interpretations) can be detected and corrected without any
individual cell knowing that one occurred.
In 1992, David Mumford published an influential theory on the roles
of the cortical pathways26. Like with Stephen Grossberg’s model, a
26 David Mumford (1992)higher area would send its expectation template down to the lower
area. The lower area now attempts to reconcile this expectation with
its input, and sends up only those features of the data that were
not expected, a principle now known as predictive coding27. So
27 Yanping Huang and Rajesh Rao
(2011). Predictive coding. Wiley
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive
Science, 2(5):580–593
instead of only notifying that there is a mismatch, it reports exactly
what features were not accounted for. The higher area can use this
information and try to revise its interpretation in the right way, while
at the same time trying to comply with the expectations from the even
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higher levels. The templates are to be flexible, incorporating some
uncertainties in their prediction in order to account for the variations
of patterns, or equivalently in order to allow the higher level to ignore
details28.
28 More on this in section §5.7.
Theories like these have led to the belief that, rather than a ‘cognitive
couch potato’29 that passively processes incoming signals, the brain is
29 Term stolen from Andy Clark (2014)
Andy Clark (2014). Bayesian predictive
coding. Recorded talk in a Greenland
trip organised by the Moscow Center
for Consciousness Studies
a proactive system that attempts to model the causes of its sensations,
simulate the external world, and generate expectations for its inputs.
The actual inputs are compared to the expectations, and mismatches
are used to revise the simulation’s assumptions about the current
situation, so in non-trivial situations inference proceeds iteratively
until a suitable interpretation has settled. When seeing generation
as the brain’s primary activity, the diagram of the cortical hierarchy
could equally well be turned upside down so that the feed-forward
connections are regarded as the feedback connections, providing a
corrective signal that makes the generation stay in sync with the real
world.
The belief that the brain processes its input by continuously making
predictions has found wide support, and it is considered quite likely
that some kind of predictive coding mechanism is an intrinsic part of
this predictive processing. Outside the academic world, books like
On Intelligence by Jeff Hawkins30 have popularised the main ideas, as
30 Jeff Hawkins and Sandra Blakeslee
(2007). On intelligence. Macmillanhave many optical illusions and tricks that reveal how much human
perception is primed by context and presupposition.
3.4.2 Supporting neural phenomena
Besides arguments based on cortical connectivity and behavioural
psychology, activity measurements from neurons in the cortex also
provide hints about the role of descending connections in prediction.
One of the neurological observations that suggested an important
role for feedback in perception is the extra-classical receptive field,
which alludes to cases where the response of a neuron or column
is influenced by signals that it was not considered sensitive to, i.e.
signals outside its receptive field. For example, a line detector in V1,
that activates when a line segment with a particular orientation is
present in a particular location, appears to reduce in activity when the
line continues beyond its view. This quirk, called the end-stopping
effect, could be explained by postulating that the activity reports the
unexpected appearance of a line segment, and is therefore silenced
when it is part of a longer line.
In the late 1990s, Rajesh Rao and Dana Ballard demonstrated that
certain extra-classical receptive field effects, most notably the end-
stopping effect, can be reproduced by a predictive coding algorithm31.
31 Rajesh Rao and Dana Ballard (1999).
Predictive coding in the visual cortex:
a functional interpretation of some
extra-classical receptive-field effects.
Nature neuroscience, 2(1):79–87
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In their architecture, units in a lower hierarchical level see only
a small area of the input, giving each higher layer unit a larger
receptive field. The error signal a level sends up consists of each
unit’s activation minus the prediction it receives from above. The
activations at the bottom are just the pixel values, and at each
following level the activations are determined by minimising both the
incoming and the outgoing error signals. A prediction is formed by a
linear transformation of the level’s activations, possibly followed by a
sigmoidal non-linearity. The weight matrices are trained to minimise
the average residual prediction errors when given natural image
patches as input. The end-stopping effect can be demonstrated by
passing in (unnatural) images of a bar of different lengths. Because in
natural image patches lines tend to continue, the learnt basis features
are less capable of generating short lines, making that short bars leave
a higher residual error. For the unit shown in the plot, the responses
qualitatively correspond to activations of layer 2/3 neurons in the
primary visual cortex.
Although the described model is unrealistically simple, its ability to
exhibit phenomena observed in the cortex increases the plausibility
that the cortex applies some form of predictive coding. Besides
the extra-classical receptive field effects, several other measured
phenomena could be explained by predictive processing. In particular,
transient neural activity upon changing input seems to match well
with the process of updating one’s interpretation, after which activity
is quenched by resulting new predictions. From brain activity
measurements (e.g. eeg), it is known that an ‘oddball’ stimulus can
elicit significant electrical responses, such as the Mismatch-Negativity
(mmn) or P300 response, commonly triggered by inserting infrequent
deviant tones in a repetitive tone sequence. The brain appears able to
learn to expect deviations, matching closely with what hierarchical
predictive coding theories would suggest to happen32.
32 Catherine Wacongne, Etienne Labyt,
Virginie van Wassenhove, Tristan
Bekinschtein, Lionel Naccache, and
Stanislas Dehaene (2011). Evidence
for a hierarchy of predictions and
prediction errors in human cortex.
Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 108(51):20754–20759
3.4.3 Probabilistic views
Transcending the implementations and mechanisms, many re-
searchers have proposed theoretical frameworks to understand how
(human) intelligence works. A significant group uses probability
theory to interpret the brain as a mechanism that perceives by
performing (or approximating) Bayesian inference in a probabilistic
hierarchical generative model, and that learns this model by applying
empirical Bayes. In the Bayesian inference perspective, the descending
connections in the cortical hierarchy are interpreted as communicating
prior probabilities for the values of the targeted lower layer, which
combines this prior with information from the ascending pathway to
infer the likeliness of its possible values.
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This view is still too vague to pin down an exact meaning of neural
signals, whose spiking activity could perhaps encode the probabilities
of values, the most likely value, or other distribution parameters. If it
is presumed that the cortex applies predictive coding, the ascending
pathway should in some way convey the unexpectedness of the
inferred values with regard to their prior, so that the neurons will be
silent when the higher levels have formed a correct interpretation.
Not unlike a Monte Carlo Markov Chain (mcmc) method, cortical
regions concurrently update their values, send new priors down and
error signals up, and thereby form a recurrent process that should
lead to the system as a whole converging to a consistent interpretation,
i.e. a set of values with high probability given the sensory input33.
33 Tai Sing Lee and David Mumford
(2003). Hierarchical bayesian inference
in the visual cortex. JOSA A, 20(7):1434–
1448
Learning and inference can be elegantly combined in this probabilistic
interpretation. The inference process can be viewed as performing
the expectation step of an expectation–maximisation algorithm. The
maximisation step is the way of learning the synaptic weights, which,
after having inferred each level’s values, updates the ways as to
make the current state more probable34. The optimisation objective
34 Rajesh Rao and Dana Ballard (1997).
Dynamic model of visual recognition
predicts neural response properties in
the visual cortex. Neural Computation,
9(4):721–763
can be formulated as reducing the so-called ‘free energy’, a concept
borrowed from statistical physics, which here amounts to the total
prediction error35. Inference thus tries to find the best interpretation
35 Karl Friston (2005). A theory
of cortical responses. Philosophical
transactions of the Royal Society B:
Biological sciences, 360(1456):815–836
that minimises the prediction errors for the given input, while the
learning process tries to find the best synaptic weights to minimise
prediction errors averaged over a longer time scale.
Models like these attempt to explain the functioning and architecture
of the brain by regarding them as an implementation that pursues
a single, information-theoretic goal. Extensions to these theories
incorporate action into the model, explaining reflexes and behaviour
as resulting from the very same objective of reducing prediction error,
and perhaps try to include some explanation for consciousness 36.
36 Andy Clark (2013). Whatever next?
predictive brains, situated agents,
and the future of cognitive science.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(03):181–
2043.5 Untapped inspiration
Although discoveries from brain research have provided quite some
inspiration for the creation of artificial neural networks, many con-
cepts that seem to be employed by the cortex have not quite found
their way yet into the machine learning world. Perhaps the most
remarkable difference between the two fields is the current focus in
machine learning research on the feed-forward inference network.
When algorithms implement generation, it is usually separated from
inference, and when they apply recurrence the ideas of building a
hierarchy are often left out.
In chapter 5, we will use the just described ideas about iterative
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Bayesian inference in the cortex in order to come up with im-
provements for the way we approximate inference in probabilistic
generative models. But first, we leave the networks themselves
mostly unchanged, and devote a chapter to the role that downward
connections could have in learning the connection weights.
4Generation as feedback for learning
Practically every deep learning method uses a feedback path, defined
either explicitly or implicitly, to solve the central problem of credit
assignment: how to tweak the network’s parameters (weights) in
order to improve the model. Most algorithms perform inference in a
single feed-forward pass, but to determine useful parameter updates
in every layer they back-propagate gradients of their cost function
down the network.
In this chapter, we take a better look at back-propagation and its issues,
and consider alternative methods of providing feedback signals for
learning. We will find that adding an extra path for back-propagation
feels overcomplicated and unnecessary for unsupervised algorithms
that already incorporate both a bottom-up inference and a top-down
generation path, so in particular we focus on methods that use those
existing paths to provide the learning signals for each other, leading
us to the existing ideas of target propagation and recirculation, and
to more general insights about alternative and local approaches to
learning.
4.1 Back-propagation of gradients
In most neural network design nowadays, parameter update rules
are specified only implicitly, by defining an objective function and
assuming that a gradient-based optimisation algorithm will determine
good updates. In contrast to earlier days, in which learning rules
would be designed more directly, attention now seems to go to the
design of the inference network, and learning almost seems to come
as an afterthought. To obtain a connectionistic model incorporating
both learning and inference, we can work out the optimiser’s update
calculations to reveal the complete network of computations involved
in learning, which can be more fitly compared to neural networks in
the brain.
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4.1.1 The gradient calculation
For the purpose of obtaining a simple network diagram, we assume
that input data are processed one by one, thus performing online
learning or stochastic gradient descent (sgd) with a mini-batch size
of 1. In practice, hardly anybody uses plain sgd, and an abundance
of variations have been developed, ranging from adding momentum
to invoking batch normalisation, but the basic principle of gradient
calculation usually remains the same1. To start with, let us take the
1 Note that for example second-order
methods are not considered here, and
are quite a different case; however
they are less popular due to their
computational cost.
following three-layer mlp:
W1
u1 = W1x
W2
W3
y = φ3 (u3)
h2 = φ2 (u2)
h1 = φ1 (u1)
x
e = y− t
C = ‖e‖2
t
u2 = W2h1
u3 = W3h3
Figure 4.1: A simple mlp with
the squared error between the
output value y and a given tar-
get value t as its cost function.
The activation before the non-
linearities φl are denoted as ul .
The updates for the weight matrices can straightforwardly be derived
using the chain rule for derivatives. The weight update for W3 is
computed by taking the gradient of the cost function to W3:
∆W3 ∝ − ∂C
∂W3
= − ∂u3
∂W3
∂C
∂u3
= − ∂C
∂u3
hT2 = −
∂y
∂u3
∂C
∂y
hT2 = −φ′3 (u3) ehT2
And likewise updates are computed forW2 andW1, which each reuse
part of the gradient computation in of the layer above it, hence the
name back-propagation:
∆W2 ∝ − ∂C
∂W2
= − ∂u2
∂W2
∂C
∂u2
= − ∂u2
∂W2
(
∂h2
∂u2
∂u3
∂h2
∂C
∂u3
)
= −
(
φ′2 (u2)WT3
∂C
∂u3
)
hT1
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∆W1 ∝ − ∂C∂W1
= − ∂u1
∂W1
∂h1
∂u1
∂u2
∂h1
∂C
∂u2
= −φ′1 (u1)WT2
∂C
∂u2
xT
Drawn into the diagram, this computation proceeds from the top to
bottom layer, forming a feedback path opposing the inference path
and telling the lower layers how to change in order to satisfy the
objective at the top:
φ′2 (u2)
W1
u1 = W1x
W2
W3
y = φ3 (u3)
h2 = φ2 (u2)
h1 = φ1 (u1)
x
e = y− t
C = ‖e‖2
t
WT3
∆W3
u2 = W2h1
u3 = W3h3
φ′3 (u3)
∂C/∂u3
∂C/∂u2
∆W2
φ′1 (u1)
∂C/∂u1
∆W1
WT2
Figure 4.2: The same network as
in the previous figure, but now
including the back-propagation
path in the diagram.
4.1.2 Issues with back-propagation
Although back-propagation has proved very useful for many tasks, it
has a few known, interconnected problems. When networks become
deeper, gradients have to pass through many layers and tend to
decay or explode, making it hard to perform learning properly in
the lowest layers. Since back-propagation measures only a very local
direction of improvement, only small update steps can be taken, and
large numbers of iterations are required for learning, taking lots of
computational power, as was mentioned in the introduction).
To keep gradients at reasonable magnitudes in a deep network,
layers are required to behave sufficiently linearly, as e.g. a saturated
response of neurons kills the gradient. The use of back-propagation
thus imposes limitations on the design of the inference network,
hindering the use of saturation, neural competition, recurrence and
46
other strongly non-linear behaviour. Moreover, it has been shown
that networks with a high degree of linearity inherently suffer from
undesired extrapolation effects, making that data with unnoticeable
amounts of carefully crafted noise (so-called ‘adversarial’ examples)
can confuse the inference process2.
2 Ian Goodfellow (2015). Do statistical
models ‘understand’ the world? Talk
at the RE.WORK deep learning
summit 2015 ; and Christian
Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya
Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan,
Ian Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus
(2013). Intriguing properties of neural
networks. arXiv:1312.6199
Insight: Relying on back-propagation for learning limits the freedom
of network design.
Besides practical issues, a frequently reported annoyance of back-
propagation is its biological implausibility:
“Many neuroscientists treat backpropagation with deep suspicion
because it is not at all obvious how to implement it in cortex.”3
3 Geoffrey Hinton (2007b). To recognize
shapes, first learn to generate images.
Progress in brain research, 165:535–547
One reason for the suspicion is that because in order to compute the
gradients, the feedback path needs to know the synaptic weights of
the inference path, and it is deemed impossible that the brain could
be using this method, as in some way a ‘weight transport’ would be
required to keep the two paths matched4. This observation has led
4 Stephen Grossberg (1987).
Competitive learning: From interactive
activation to adaptive resonance.
Cognitive science, 11(1):23–63
many to seek approximations to back-propagation that could provide
more plausible explanations for learning in the brain, for example by
loosening the symmetry requirements5, applying contrastive Hebbian
5 Qianli Liao, Joel Leibo, and Tomaso
Poggio (2015). How important is
weight symmetry in backpropagation?
arXiv:1510.05067
learning6, or using completely random fixed weight matrices in the
6 Xiaohui Xie and Sebastian Seung
(2003). Equivalence of backpropagation
and contrastive Hebbian learning in a
layered network. Neural computation,
15(2):441–454
feedback path7.
7 Timothy Lillicrap, Daniel Cownden,
Douglas Tweed, and Colin Akerman
(2014). Random feedback weights
support learning in deep neural
networks. arXiv:1411.0247
Remarkably, quite some of these alternative methods seek to modify
mlp learning to provide a plausible learning mechanism for the
brain, but while doing that still assume the presence of a desired
output value for each input, implying that the brain would implement
supervised learning. Since brains normally do not learn specified
input-output mappings, it may be more fruitful to instead investigate
methods for unsupervised learning. Of course, one could argue that
supervised methods can be applied for unsupervised learning by
setting the output target value equal to the input value, which is
the essence of an auto-encoder. However, any method similar to
back-propagation seems a contrived and unnatural way of training
auto-encoders, because it creates two mostly separated networks,
and introduces a second bottom-up and a second top-down path to
provide the feedback for learning:
Learning signals thus have to travel back all the way through the
decoder and encoder, because only at the very output layer an
objective is specified (plus possibly a regularisation objective in the
middle). While in supervised learning it may make more sense
that the whole network is adjusted in order to please the output
value, in auto-encoders producing the target value is not the primary
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∆W4
e = x− xˆ
x xˆ
W1
W2 W3
W4
∂C/∂u4
∂C/∂u3
∆W3
∂C/∂u2
∂C/∂u1
∆W2
∆W1 W
T
4
WT3W
T
2
h1
h2
hˆ1
Figure 4.3: In an auto-encoder,
travelling all the way up and
down again looks like a need-
less detour, especially if the net
would be deeper. For clarity
the details are omitted from this
diagram.
goal, which perhaps permits different ways of approaching the
problem. Instead of regarding the encoder and decoder as completely
separate networks, the symmetry of encoder and decoder should
be exploited to treat corresponding encoder and decoder layers as
different ‘sides’ of the same layer. More generally stated, it even feels
somewhat narrow-minded to apply supervised learning methods to
unsupervised learning.
Insight: Sticking too close to supervised learning techniques when
doing unsupervised learning hampers free thought.
Further below we will consider spreading out the objective through
the network, and then getting rid of the back-propagation path
altogether, but first we ask ourselves whether and why we actually
want feedback for learning.
4.2 Why need a feedback path?
It has been tacitly assumed that in deep learning, some kind of
feedback would be required to teach the lower layers to please the
higher layers. In supervised learning, this principle makes sense
because the higher layers have very specific targets, whereas the lower
layers have no clue what is desired of them. In unsupervised learning,
with the purpose of disentangling concepts to form more useful data
representations, the requirement is not so obvious. An interesting and
very fundamental question is whether or why such feedback would
be needed at all.
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4.2.1 Learning without feedback
To commence in support of the opposite premise, it is indeed possible
to do unsupervised deep learning without top-down feedback. This
is what happens in greedy algorithms, in which layers optimise
for a local objective without taking subsequent layers into account,
so higher layers are unable to influence the learning in the layers
further below. These algorithms commonly proceed by starting with
a shallow, one-layer network, and training it on the data to learn a
new representation. Then these representations are treated as the new
data for a next layer that is put on top of the first, which learns to
disentangle this representation a bit further, while leaving the bottom
layer fixed. This process can be repeated to build a deep network as a
stack of individually trained one-layer networks.
Greedy layer-wise training sparked interest in deep learning in
2006, after unprecedented learning results were obtained by stacking
restricted Boltzmann machines (rbms) to pre-train deep belief nets
(dbns)8. This inspired related work such as stacked auto-encoders9
8 Geoffrey Hinton, Simon Osindero,
and Yee-Whye Teh (2006). A fast
learning algorithm for deep belief nets.
Neural computation, 18(7):1527–1554
9 Yoshua Bengio, Pascal Lamblin, Dan
Popovici, Hugo Larochelle, et al. (2007).
Greedy layer-wise training of deep
networks. Advances in neural information
processing systems, 19:153
and stacked denoising auto-encoders10, but quite soon layer-wise
10 Pascal Vincent, Hugo Larochelle,
Yoshua Bengio, and Pierre-Antoine
Manzagol (2008b). Extracting and
composing robust features with
denoising autoencoders. In Proceedings
of the 25th international conference on
machine learning, pages 1096–1103.
ACM
(pre-)training lost popularity due to improved results with plain
back-propagation11.
11 e.g. Dan Claudiu Ciresan et al. 2010;
Alex Krizhevsky et al. 2012
Another notable example of layer-wise training in unsupervised
learning is the application of three layers of topographic ica on
images, in which — without subsequent supervised training — some
units in the highest layer appeared to respond to the presence of a
human face or of a cat face in an image12. Like normal ica, a tica
12 Quoc Le, Marc’Aurelio Ranzato,
Rajat Monga, Matthieu Devin,
Kai Chen, Greg Corrado, Jeff
Dean, and Andrew Ng (2011).
Building high-level features using
large scale unsupervised learning.
arXiv:1112.6209
layer extracts least-dependent (ideally independent) components, but
also pools the components with strong residual dependencies (higher-
order cumulants) together. The experiment nicely demonstrates that
plainly removing the statistical dependency structure from the data,
step by step, can reveal variables that correspond to abstract concepts.
A usable metaphor for the approach is that the structure in the data
is peeled off like the layers of an onion, the removal of one layer
revealing the next.
Insight: An elegant objective for unsupervised learning is to peel off
the predictable structure from the data.
4.2.2 Lower layers lack knowledge
Despite occasional utility, most often for pre-training, greedy layer-
wise training is ultimately not very promising. The fundamental issue
is, as it is more often with greedy algorithms, that doing the best
possible step at every layer does not necessarily lead to the best end
result. For the higher layers to produce an optimal result, the lower
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layers may need to prepare the data in a way that, at their layer, is
not clear why it would be a good choice. Therefore, knowledge about
how the subsequent steps are doing may be required to reach the
higher goal.
The way this issue manifests in unsupervised learning, is that a
relation between patterns may not be detectable in a lower layer,
while that lower layer does need to extract those patterns from the
data. Only when the structure has been detected it may be known
how to expose it better, so the lower layer needs to hear from above
which patterns to extract. Limitedness of resources plays a role here,
since lower layers may have to choose which patterns to spend their
units on, while only at higher layers it will be known which ones are
relevant. Seen in another way, a lower layer may have many possible
ways to peel off the structure, that may for that layer’s objective seem
equally satisfying, but leave the data in a different state for the next
layer. Without top-down information, the result could depend even
on tiny differences in its initial conditions, so some guidance from
the layer above would direct it to choose the option that best reveals
the deeper structure.
Insight: Lower layers are unaware of higher-order relations, so they
need guidance to choose in which way to peel.
Altogether, the case for unsupervised learning may actually not be
that different from supervised learning. In principle, we should be
able to use an unsupervised learning technique to do supervised
learning by giving the label as an extra input, possibly directly to a
high layer. For example, we could give a single bit indicating ‘happy’
or ‘sad’ along with images of faces. For the system to figure out as
much as possible of the structure in the data, it should learn to extract
emotional indicators in its lower layers, since they correlate strongly
with the supplied mood bit.
A nice observation is that also without manually providing it as an
input, mood is likely to emerge in a latent variable because it has
predictive power over the whole face, and top-down feedback will
then be useful to refine indicative patterns, to both increase and
exploit the predictive power.
4.3 Higher layer objectives
The issues with back-propagation learning arise from the fact that
layers try to satisfy an objective on which they have only very indirect
influence. The obvious way to ameliorate this problem is to originate
learning signals closer to the layers on which they act, by providing
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objectives throughout the network rather than at a single spot. In
the auto-encoder architecture, this can be achieved by exploiting the
symmetry between the encoder and decoder paths. Rather than only
at the bottom, one can for instance demand that at every layer hl the
difference between encoder and decoder values is minimised:
Cl =
∥∥∥hl − hˆl∥∥∥2
Effectively, the subnetwork above (and including) that layer is then
treated as an auto-encoder, and the decoder learns to reconstruct the
encoder’s value at every layer. Besides, since unlike at the bottom layer
the encoder’s values are computed rather than fixed, the encoder also
learns to produce representations that the decoder can reconstruct
well, although a regularisation objective may have to be added to
prevent it from learning trivial (e.g. constant) representations.
4.3.1 Composed into a single objective
Higher layer objectives can be used in combination with back-
propagation, by combining them into a single cost function and
using this as the objective for all parameters. The cost function is
then the sum of the errors at each level, including the original overall
reconstruction error at the bottom. The contributions of the layers can
be scaled by constant factors to set their relative importance, normally
to give more weight to the errors at lower layers:
Ctotal = ∑
l<L
alCl
In the computation graph, each layer injects its error into the feedback
path, so that by the linearity of derivatives the gradient at every layer
is the desired weighted sum of the individual objectives’ gradients
with respect to that layer. The result of the approach is that if the
gradient carrying the overall reconstruction error has decayed strongly,
the layers still receive a significant learning signal from the layers
close by, guiding them to make the subnetworks good auto-encoders,
and thereby speeding up the learning process.
An example application of higher layer objectives is the Ladder
network13, which forms a deep denoising auto-encoder in which
13 Harri Valpola (2014). From neural
PCA to deep unsupervised learning.
arXiv:1411.7783
each layer has the objective to denoise a noisy version of the encoder’s
value.
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4.3.2 Using only local objectives
An interesting alternative to the approach of optimising every layer
with the same composition of all layers’ objectives, is to use only the
local objective for the training of each layer. By simply not applying
the chain rule of derivatives, this approach yields local learning rules.
This means that each layer updates its weights using information
available in that layer, and thus completely removes the need for the
back-propagation path.
The big question in this case is whether these independently learning
layers will together still form a coherent model. As argued earlier, for
a high layer to perform optimally some feedback to the lower layers
would be desired in order to teach them how to serve its needs. Back-
propagation of an objective function gradient would be the obvious
solution to communicate its needs, but perhaps local learnings rules
can also be made ‘globally aware’ by including information from
above in their objectives, and this the approach we will investigate.
The just proposed higher layer objectives, although simplistic and
unrefined, do incorporate information from above by depending on
the reconstructed values.
To ensure a formal justification for a local update rule, ideally a
layer’s gradient of its local objective would always point in the same
direction as the gradient of the global (composed) objective, in which
case using the local learning rules would be equivalent to using back-
propagation with the composed objective. A similar but easier goal
would be to require that the update of each parameter at least has
the same sign as it would have had when using back-propagation14.
14 Yann Le Cun (1986). Learning
process in an asymmetric threshold
network. In Disordered systems and
biological organization, pages 233–240.
Springer
Even more lenient, but likely still sufficient, would be to just keep
the angle between the two directions below 90º, so that updates still
ascent towards the objective, although perhaps not taking the steepest
ascent15. Remember as well that steepest descent is a greedy form of
15 Timothy Lillicrap et al. (2014)
optimisation, and updates deviating from the ‘ideal’ direction could
in fact be superior.
4.4 Generation as feedback
The main question in this chapter is whether the generation path can
simultaneously serve as feedback for the inference path, providing
the information required for the lower layers to determine how to
better please the higher layers. Admittedly, this quest for using a
single path for two purposes is partly driven by a desire for elegance
and biological plausibility, as it is not evident that a model containing
multiple paths necessarily poses a problem. The currently ubiquitous
approach of gradient back-propagation does however pose problems,
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as has been argued above, so integrating the generative model more
heavily into the learning process seems a logical thing to try. There
have been several algorithms and ideas with similar intent, a few of
which are worth noting here.
4.4.1 Wake-sleep algorithm
A good method to look at first is the wake-sleep algorithm, a simple
and intuitive algorithm to learn two directed probabilistic models, one
for generation and one for inference, by alternately teaching either
to invert the other. In the wake phase, a datum is passed upwards
through the inference model, and the generative model is updated
to, at each layer, make it more likely to generate the lower from
the upper value. In the sleep phase, a ‘fantasy’ value is sampled
from the generative model, and the inference model is updated to
more probably infer the fantasy’s causes. Because each layer learns
individually to invert one step of the opposite path, the updates are
completely local, although the algorithm is not greedy.
[diagram]
A variation of wake-sleep, called up-down, has been used for fine-
tuning deep belief nets16. Instead of starting the generation pass with
16 Geoffrey Hinton et al. (2006)
a completely random sample at the top layer, it samples it with a bias
towards the top level value in the inference path17. If, instead, that
17 More specifically, sampling proceeds
by a few iterations of Gibbs sampling
in the rbm formed by the two topmost
layers.
top level value would simply be copied from the inference top layer,
the resemblance with variational auto-encoders becomes apparent,
while the training method can be interpreted as a form of target
propagation.
4.4.2 Target propagation
The idea of target propagation is to provide, instead of a gradient
towards an objective, a target value to each layer that would help
achieve an objective at the top. Intuitively, if the inverse function of
an inference network is available, it is possible to compute which
values of lower layers would have resulted in a desired value at
the top. In other words, the target value is propagated downwards
using the inverse functions, and each layer locally computes a weight
update to steer its value closer towards its given target. Different from
back-propagation, non-linearity and even discrete-valued activation
functions do not pose a problem, as long as the inverse function is
available for the occurring values. Under simple conditions, it can
be shown that this method can yield updates that have the same
signs as the updates back-propagation would compute using all layer
objectives combined18.
18 Yann Le Cun (1986)
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The inverse function required for target propagation is exactly what
the generation side (decoder) of an auto-encoder approximates.
Although in unsupervised learning no explicit target value is given
for the top layer, the principles can be applied nevertheless and the
auto-encoder can be trained by providing target values for each layer,
an idea hatched by Yoshua Bengio19. The challenge is to decide on
19 Yoshua Bengio (2014). How
auto-encoders could provide credit
assignment in deep networks via
target propagation. arXiv:1407.7906
good targets for the layers, which by the way need not be the same
for the encoder as for the decoder.
To exploit the principle of target propagation, a layer’s target for
its encoder step should be the value produced at that layer by the
decoder. Because the encoder is (presumably) the inverse of the
decoder, when a lower layer adapts towards its target value, it will
cause the higher layers to do so too, thereby achieving exactly what
we desire of a feedback path.
It would make some sense to likewise use the encoded value as the
target for the decoder, to ensure that the decoder properly reconstructs
encoder values, and thus indeed keeps approximating the inverse
of the encoder. In this symmetric case we arrive at exactly the local
objectives Cl =
∥∥∥hl − hˆl∥∥∥2 introduced above. Despite its elegance, this
choice is probably too naive, and would result in many unhelpful
updates when the layers are not yet forming good auto-encoders, so
better targets are desired to prevent the learning process from getting
stuck.
To be useful as targets for the encoder, preferably the values produced
by the decoder would in some way be justifiably better than the
currently inferred values. Using the training method from the
denoising auto-encoder, noise can be added to the input of the
decoder’s layers while the target for the decoder is the clean value in
the encoder. The reconstructions are then expectedly cleaner (more
probable) versions of the values in the encoder, and could be suitable
as targets to make the encoder learn to separate information from
noise and disentangle the information to make it easier to model in
the subsequent layers.
There are still many details to be figured out to implement these
ideas. In the learning algorithm sketched by Yoshua Bengio, values
are propagated through the decoder cleanly to serve as targets for
the encoder, while the decoder is trained to denoise by at each layer
also corrupting its input with noise and using the encoder value as
target20.
20 Yoshua Bengio (2014), algorithm 2,
second loop
Moreover, the algorithm alternates learning with these propagated
targets with layer-wise training to ensure the layers individually are
good and contractive auto-encoders, as well as to provide a way to
train the top layer21. To do this again without back-propagation,
21 Yoshua Bengio (2014), algorithm 2,
first looptargets for this step are created by a denoising variation of the
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recirculation procedure, a method described below.
In practical experiments by Yoshua Bengio’s research group, it was
found that the imperfectness of auto-encoders obstructs learning, but
can be accounted for by incorporating a linear correction in what has
been named difference target propagation22.
22 Dong-Hyun Lee, Saizheng Zhang,
Asja Fischer, and Yoshua Bengio
(2015). Difference target propagation.
In Machine Learning and Knowledge
Discovery in Databases, pages 498–515.
Springer
4.4.3 Recirculation
In the algorithms we have treated up to now, the units in the
generative path could be regarded as related to, but distinct from, the
units of the encoder path. If implemented in the cortex, they would
be close to each other, probably situated in different cortical layers in
the same column. Another option is that the descending path would
reuse the same neurons that were used in the ascending path. The
downward, generative pass would then update the activations that
were determined in the forward pass. The idea of the recirculation
algorithm23 is that subsequently a second forward pass could then be
23 Geoffrey Hinton and James
McClelland (1988). Learning
representations by recirculation.
In Neural information processing systems,
pages 358–366. New York: American
Institute of Physics
used to inform the higher one of two layers about the effect it had on
the lower one, and thereby provide it with a learning signal.
In learning a basic, single hidden layer auto-encoder, the decoder
weights can easily be updated using gradient descent, since the datum
serves as the target value for the reconstruction. The recirculation
algorithm suggests to apply the same principle to learn the encoder,
by treating the initial encoded value as the target value for the second
forward pass.
An additional idea applied in recirculation is to give the bottom units
a high level of regression, meaning that their value is changed towards,
rather than replaced by, the reconstruction coming from above. This
regression makes that the value passed upwards in the second
forward pass is not much different from that in the first, so the hidden
layer measures the effect of a small change in its input. Because
for small changes a network behaves roughly linearly, the method
effectively measures the gradient and can approximate gradient
descent on the reconstruction error. One remaining requirement for
this to work is that the encoder and decoder weights are symmetric.
Luckily, the learning procedure is self-aligning, so unmatched weights
will automatically adapt to produce symmetry.
4.5 Learning through recurrence
The old and largely forgotten recirculation method, and its modest
revival in target propagation, can provide inspiration for creating
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globally-aware local learning rules, like was desired in section §4.3.2.
Although the method is described for a simple auto-encoder with one
hidden layer, we can reuse its core principle, which is to learn locally
from the differences between old and new values in what essentially
is a recurrent neural network formed by the inference model and
generative model together. This principle has for example led to the
‘generalized recirculation algorithm’ 24, and will form the basis of the
24 Randall O’Reilly (1996). Biologically
plausible error-driven learning using
local activation differences: The
generalized recirculation algorithm.
Neural computation, 8(5):895–938
learning paradigm assumed throughout the rest of this thesis.
4.5.1 Local learning signals from temporal difference
Since the use of a (vector) target value for a layer in fact applies a
scalar target value to each unit individually, the principle of learning
from temporal value changes is easily seen to be a generalisation of
the Hebbian learning rule. Hebbian learning strengthens connections
between activated neurons and their active inputs (“neurons that
fire together, wire together”), or, in other words, a neuron’s current
output value is used as the target for its current input. The rule can
be generalised, such that current as well as previous activations can
be targets for either current or previous inputs.
We can compare how learning algorithms differ when applying the
assumption that their inference and generation paths reuse the same
units. In recirculation, in both layers their previous output value
is the target output for the current input, thereby measuring the
imperfectness of the auto-encoder and learning to reduce it. In target
propagation as described above, this same rule still basically holds
for learning the decoder, but the encoder appears to learn the other
way around: the new (top-down generated) value of a layer is used as
the target for the previous input from below. Intuitively, the encoded
value in a layer can be considered as the initial impression, and the
reconstructed value as the refined interpretation after having fully
processed the input. By using the refined interpretation as the target
for the encoder, it should learn to infer the refined interpretation
directly when given similar input in the future.
Insight: The core learning objective of a unit in a recurrent network
could be to directly obtain the value it will settle to later.
4.5.2 Neural plausibility
In the brain, learning from temporal differences is a very plausible
learning mechanism, as has for example been suggested by Geoffrey
Hinton25. An observed phenomenon in neural synapses is spike-
25 Geoffrey Hinton (2007a). How to do
backpropagation in a brain. Invited
talk at the NIPS 2007 Deep Learning
Workshop
timing-dependent plasticity (stdp), which means that the change
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in synaptic strength depends on the relative timing of the spikes of
the post-synaptic and pre-synaptic neuron. Commonly, the synapse
grows in strength most strongly when the post-synaptic neuron fires
within milliseconds after the pre-synaptic neuron, which matches
with Hebbian learning since the pre-synaptic spike was contributing
to triggering the post-synaptic neuron26.
26 Wulfram Gerstner et al. (2002),
chapter 10.
An interesting variation to Hebbian learning can result when a slightly
longer time difference still invokes plasticity. The effect would be
that the synapse grows when the pre-synaptic spike did not actually
contribute, but it could have been listened to in order to fire earlier.
Like suggested above, neurons then learn to directly acquire the state
they will settle to later, in other words they learn to predict their own
activation27. Another interpretation of this effect is that neurons learn
27 Yoshua Bengio (2014), section 8.
to keep their output constant upon changing input. This reminds of
slow feature analysis, and is an intuitive way of creating invariances.
Invariances that are not necessarily temporal may also be learnt this
way, for example translation invariance could be learnt because objects
(or eyes) move.
Staying close to usual auto-encoders, in this chapter it has often been
assumed that we receive single inputs, and perform the generation
pass after an inference pass. When dealing with a continuous stream
of input, as is the case in brains and for example robotics, it makes
sense to consider generation to happen alternately or simultaneously
with inference. Although we will not go into it here, the discussed
methods could be adapted to use a reconstruction from previous
input as a learning signal for the current input.
4.5.3 Amortised inference
One sensible way to create target values for the inference model,
would be to perform more accurate inference with an iterative optimi-
sation procedure, and use its result as a target for the approximate in-
ference model. This approach follows the idea of amortised inference
algorithms, which could be described as “learning how to do inference
faster next time”. Predictive sparse decomposition (section §2.4.2)
fits in this category, and more sophisticated approaches have tried to
make the approximation more powerful, by designing the inference
model’s architecture such that it resembles the computation done by
optimisation procedures28. Such a network would be recurrent and
28 Karol Gregor and Yann LeCun
(2010). Learning fast approximations
of sparse coding. In Proceedings of the
27th International Conference on Machine
Learning (ICML-10), pages 399–406
trained by back-propagating through time, where to improve learning
the target value could be assigned to every time step, to encourage the
network to arrive at the optimal interpretation as fast as possible29.
29 Ulugbek S Kamilov and Hassan
Mansour (2015). Learning optimal
nonlinearities for iterative thresholding
algorithms. arXiv:1512.04754
Insight: A slow optimisation inference procedure can provide the
target value for learning a fast approximation.
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In the following chapter we will look how the generative model itself
can be leveraged to perform more accurate inference, and in the
synthesis we will shortly get back to how to use the hereby inferred
values as local learning targets for the layers.
4.6 The curse of deep learning
Before finishing this chapter, one more point to bring up is that some
of the intuitions behind the deep learning methods covered here may
be valid only when the higher layers of the model are assumed to
already have learnt some adequate parameters. In case of the wake-
sleep algorithm, the generative model initially produces complete
nonsense, which the inference network then attempts to invert, so it
can take a long time before the system learns something reasonable.
At the bottom layer the generation will learn to produce the actual
data, but it will produce them from the random fantasies of the layer
above, whose distribution will change when the network above learns.
There is something unsatisfying in the method of learning because
it seems fundamentally inefficient, if it works at all without getting
stuck.
Target propagation suffers similarly from the problem, as it relies
on the higher layers to produce good targets for the layers below
them. As the higher layers completely determine lower-level values,
whatever the lower layers learn initially will be based on a state of the
higher layers that will change itself. This struggle between learning
higher layers while not forgetting what was learnt in the lower layers
may be a reason for the large amount of iterations usually required
for learning. The issue also occurs when training a deep auto-encoder
with back-propagation, because there the initial updates to a low layer
in the encoder are also calculated to benefit the objective under the
assumption that the layers above remain unchanged.
Given these inherent inefficiencies, the idea of greedy layer-wise
training starts feeling quite attractive again, and it is not surprising
that greedy methods have proven useful for pre-training. My personal
feeling is that a learning algorithm should, without being greedy, be
designed such that adding extra layers does not complicate or slow
down the learning of the lower layers. Lower layers should be able to
function without the higher layers, but adding higher layers should
improve their performance. A higher layer should perhaps not assert
any influence initially, and gradually start mixing in when it has learnt
some patterns and has something to say. In probabilistic models this
could for example be achieved by letting higher layers initially only set
weak priors on their layers below30, while in deterministic deep auto-
30 Related to modelling variance, in
section §5.7.1encoders lateral connections between encoder and decoder should
initially provide the primary influence. Although more thought may
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be required to concoct a concrete solution, it may be good to keep the
basic concept in mind.
Insight: Low levels need to learn first. Higher layers should initially
have no influence, and start participating when they have become more
confident after learning a bit.
5Generation as feedback for inference
In most popular neural network algorithms, inference is performed
in a single feed-forward pass. The proactive role of the neocortex in
processing its sensory inputs (see section §3.4.1) provides inspiration
for how the inclusion of feedback signals could benefit inference.
Whereas several methods mentioned in the previous chapter did
suggest possible roles for the descending connections in the cortex,
they all used these connections only to provide learning signals to lower
layers of the inference model, and neglected the whole idea that
top-down signals could serve a role in input processing itself.
In this chapter we will investigate how feedback can be useful when
approximating inference in a learnt directed generative model. We
will find that using the downward connections of the generative
model in close concert with usual upward connections of the inference
model leads to a substantially different approach to inference, forming
structured recurrence and processing inputs iteratively. Although
recurrent networks are more commonly applied when the input is a
time-varying data stream, for the sake of simplicity, as well as to stay
close to previously described models, we will generally assume we
are dealing with static input, for example a single image. To start with,
we will look at the reasons to depart from feed-forward inference.
5.1 Why not feed-forward?
It is worth spending a moment to ponder about the fundamental
question why feed-forward networks would be suboptimal for infer-
ence, which after all is intrinsically about forming a representation in
the higher layers of a datum fed in at the bottom. A first, somewhat
general answer is that adding a feedback loop effectively creates
an infinitely deep network, and is thereby in theory capable of
producing more complex behaviour1. Ideally the inference network
1 In theory, one could build a turing
machine (although with finite
tape) with a recurrent net (Heikki
Hyötyniemi, 1996) .
Heikki Hyötyniemi (1996). Turing
machines are recurrent neural
networks. Proceedings of STeP, pages
13–24
would perform accurate Bayesian inference in the generative model
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and thus compute p (h|x), which is commonly much more complex
than the generation process p (x|h) that the model defines explicitly.
By making the inference network more powerful, it can better
approximate ideal inference, thereby in turn enabling us to learn
better generative models2. Adding complexity to increase modelling
2 See insight “q restrains p”, §2.2.2.
power could of course also be done by simply adding more units
and layers to a feed-forward net, but learning to use this power
is hard. Since we have knowledge about the problem we face, a
more intelligent approach is to exploit that knowledge in the network
design.
Insight: We do not want to approximate an arbitrary input-output
mapping; we want to approximate Bayesian inference. Compared to an
mlp, a neural network structure designed with this task in mind may
prove both more successful and easier to learn.
One piece of knowledge we could exploit is the structure of Bayes’
rule, p (h|x) ∝ p (x|h) p (h), which allows us to reason about the
individual influences of the separate factors p (x|h) and p (h). More-
over, perhaps the most valuable asset that we can exploit is the
availability of the generative model itself. Although the generative
model cannot tell us which h probably caused a given x, when we
propose an interpretation h it can confirm whether it matches with
this datum, and maybe we can even extract information about how
to improve the proposal. We could try to take advantage of this
possibility, let the generative model provide feedback for the inference
path, and perform inference by the iterative alteration and verification
of proposed interpretations rather than by a single feed-forward pass.
Upgrades to the network architecture could enable it to learn com-
putations that resemble message passing algorithms for probabilistic
models. When dealing with a deeper generative network, inference
becomes increasingly difficult, and provisioning the network for the
task therefore becomes both more valuable and more complicated.
The idea of sending proposals up and feedback down could be applied
between every pair of subsequent layers, but now, since the values
of the intermediate layers are not fixed, feedback can be used both
to update the proposal sent upwards and to update the layers’ own
values.
A common reason for not employing feedback loops, thus limiting
an inference network to be strictly feed-forward, is that the usual
learning method of back-propagation requires sufficient linearity of
the network to sustain significant learning signals at lower layers
(see section §4.1.2), and recurrence effectively creates an infinitely
deep network, making it hard to train3. Now if we stop relying on
3 Recurrent neural networks are
normally trained by back-propagation
through time (bptt), which boils down
to ‘unrolling’ several time steps of the
computation to obtain a feed-forward
network with shared weights between
the ‘temporal layers’.
back-propagation and design alternative learning methods instead,
the inference network can possibly use stronger non-linearities, and
recurrence need not be such a problem any more.
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Insight: End-to-end back-propagation learning obstructs the use of
recurrence. Adding a feedback loop to inference will require a change
of learning algorithm.
To focus fully on the inference procedures we will ignore the aspect of
learning in this chapter, so for now we will assume that ideal weight
configurations are magically known. Having roughly sketched how
inference could be improved for the task of Bayesian inference, the
goal is now to make these ideas more concrete, which we will head
towards by first analysing the problem of dealing with ambiguous
inputs.
5.2 Solving ambiguity
Besides requiring a powerful inference model to deal with the
complexity of inverting a generative model, a major difficulty in
inference is that although on a high level a datum may have only a
single sensible interpretation, at low levels and smaller scales, patterns
are often highly ambiguous4. An enviable ability of the brain is to
4 Alan Yuille and Daniel Kersten
(2006). Vision as bayesian inference:
analysis by synthesis? Trends in cognitive
sciences, 10(7):301–308
effortlessly infer the most sensible causes of an input with ambiguities,
finding the interpretation that makes most sense for the input as a
whole.
5.2.1 A visual example
To better understand what dealing with ambiguity means in terms of
Bayesian inference, it may help to introduce a simple example and
analyse it. Consider these hand drawn squiggles:
Figure 5.1: Apparently obvious,
but objectively ambiguous: The
RB and 12 13 are exactly the
same symbols. Thanks to Harri
Valpola for the idea.
Although they look like a string of letters and a sequence of numbers,
a better look reveals that the two symbols in the middle of the
sequences are exactly the same and could be interpreted either as
numbers (12 13) or as letters (RB)5. Humans subconsciously interpret
5 For simplicity two digits are called a
single symbol here.them as to make sense among the surrounding characters, without
even noticing the ambiguity. If we assume that some single neuron, let
us call it hl[R], has the task of detecting an R in the center of the input,
it appears to not only be affected by whether its input looks like an
R. Inferring the cause of the input requires to also take into account
whether other explanations are available, and which explanation is
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more sensible in this case. The information available on which to
base a decision for one of several explanations can conveniently be
grouped into two types:
1. The match between the input and each competing feature. Perhaps
the symbol could be either a sloppy 12 or an even more crippled R,
making it being a 12 the more likely explanation.
2. The context outside of the feature itself. Even if the symbol looks
a bit more like a 12, in a word where an R would make much more
sense, the R is the more probable explanation.
There is a clear connection between these types and Bayesian inference.
Using the first type of information roughly corresponds to assessing
the likelihood of the data given the feature, p (x|hl[R]), and should
be inferrable from a part of the input below (the unit’s receptive
field). The second type has to do with approximating the prior
probability of the feature, p (hl[R]), using the remainder of the input
and the generative model above. Combining these two would
thus be approximately proportional to the posterior probability,
p (hl[R] |x) ∝ p (x|hl[R]) p (hl[R]), so computing this value for each
alternative explanation and choosing the most probable one amounts
to doing maximum a posteriori inference.
Of course, this example shows only a simple case where two similar
but mutually exclusive features cause the ambiguity. The case
becomes more complex when multiple features together form an
alternative explanation, or when continuous values rather than binary
features are involved. The example may not be overly artificial
however, because having binary features that mutually exclude each
other seems quite natural when we assume that the generative model
uses sparse representations6.
6 We will argue for sparsity again in
section §5.7.3.
Insight: The use of sparse representations can spawn a lot of units
with alternative, conflicting explanations.
5.2.2 Designing for disambiguation
How could we modify an inference network to make it more capable
of dealing with ambiguity? From a Bayesian perspective, the idea
we will use is to encourage the network to assess the different types
of information separately and combine them to form interpretations.
Looked at schematically, we could say that Bayesian inference re-
quires four pieces of information to decide between two alternative
explanations:
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feature A feature B
match with input p (x|hA) p (x|hB)
prior expectation p (hA) p (hB)
Inference requires to combine these pieces by doing multiplication
within the columns and comparing the values of the columns. To
aid the network with doing the comparison, we will first look at
how to support lateral competition between alternative explanations.
This would allow the features to focus on their own information;
to separate, so to say, the columns of the table. Then we move on
to the most intriguing question: how to bias these competitions by
generating expectations based on the contextual information, thereby
effectively enabling units to access the rows of the table separately.
We then look how predictive coding uses expectations to filter out
expected signals and indirectly provide competition, and combine it
with the idea of biasing to get the best of everything.
5.3 Lateral competition
As the example demonstrated, the need for competition between
possible explanations naturally appears when different causes could
have produced the same result, which is fairly common in a world
with noise, uncertainty and many non-linear interactions (e.g. think of
visual occlusion). Due to this ‘explaining away’ effect, latent variables
in the generative model can become statistically dependent when
given the input. In inference, or an adequate approximation to it,
the activation of one unit thus implies the deactivation of others,
and holding competitions between units that represent alternative
explanations is a logical way to obtain this effect7.
7 Note that units do not compete
with all others, which would lead to
winner-takes-all or vector quantisation.Even if strictly taken the input would not be ambiguous, some form of
competition is still desirable because units will always be somewhat
sensitive to patterns similar to their preferred feature (since features
are normally not orthogonal). For example, a 9 and a g often look
similar, and it would be hard to make each unit’s response properties
sharp enough to only activate for its intended feature. Moreover, a
wide sensitivity may even be a very desirable property, since it helps
to generalise to unseen cases.
Insight: Competition is desirable to sharpen or widen units’ sensitivity,
to improve either discrimination or generalisation, whichever is needed.
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5.3.1 Competition in feed-forward networks
First let us look how normal feed-forward networks manage. To
start with the pathological case, observe that competition is not
possible in single layer inference network, since each unit computes its
activation independently of its peers. In probabilistic terms, the units
are assumed conditionally independent given the input, implying that
the layer has a factorisable probability distribution. It can therefore
not adequately infer the posterior of a generative model, unless that
generative model is simple enough to have a factorisable posterior8.
8 For example Restricted Boltzmann
Machines (rbms) have a factorisable
posterior by design (Geoffrey Hinton,
2000).
Geoffrey Hinton (2000). Modeling
high-dimensional data by combining
simple experts. In AAAI/IAAI, pages
1159–1164
How this handicap influences the features the network will learn will
be looked at below.
In a feed-forward network with multiple layers, the problem should
be less severe because it can learn to simulate competition, since units
can subtract activations of units below them to compare their activity
and can thereby more or less filter out overridden explanations.
−
+
−
+
Figure 5.2: A feed-forward
network could learn to
hold a form of competition
by balancing positive and
negative weights. Note that
for competition between n > 2
alternatives, an extra layer and
n2 units would be needed, to
compare every pair.
Although probably not as neatly organised as sketched in the image,
presumably contemporary algorithms learn to implement competition
to some extent. However, to achieve this the network has to learn
to create competition for each set of conflicting units by carefully
balancing the biases and positive and negative weights. Since this
seems hard to learn, takes many extra units, and the principle is
needed ubiquitously, it is tempting to provide the capability of
competition between units more directly in the network architecture.
5.3.2 The case without competition
Before getting to ways to implement competition in the architecture, it
may be helpful to get an intuitive feeling for the need for competition.
Imagine a network where units detect possible causes, but that
is completely incapable of explaining away alternative causes (e.g.
competition is turned off, or units have only positive weights). In
this case, the network would probably not be as able to create sharp
non-linearities and may behave more similar to a network with a
single layer. Multiple possible explanations would keep propagating
upwards, triggering undesired associations and hindering a univocal
and sparse interpretation.
Not being able to compete severely limits what can be successfully
learnt, although the learning algorithm will adapt a bit to the situation.
To approximate inference while lacking a way to compete with
alternative explanations, each unit will have to attempt to learn
features that will let them activate only when its alternatives will
not. For optimal detection of a particular pattern, a unit has to learn
not just to look for that pattern, but it has to focus especially on
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the aspects that differentiate its pattern from alternative but similar
patterns, in order to not accidentally activate for patterns represented
by other units.
Insight: Network architecture influences which features are optimal.
Without the ability to compete, units have to learn how their pattern
differs from others.
Focussing on what distinguishes a pattern from others may not
necessarily appear to be a problem. However, it seems to me that
conflating distinguishing features with the pattern itself complicates
learning, results in a lack of abstraction and leads to bad generalisa-
tion. Looking back at the table presented in 5.2.2, we could say that
the network is unable to separate the information from the different
columns.
Insight: Units should focus on learning the occurring pattern itself,
not on its distinguishing aspects from other patterns, to generalise
better and be reusable.
Besides this way of learning to adapt the features, remember that we
usually train both the inference model and generative model together,
and the generative model can also adapt in order to make its posterior
as factorisable as possible9.
9 See insight “q restrains p”, §2.2.2.
5.3.3 Supporting competition
In a standard feed-forward net, lateral competition between units is
technically possible but the network would have to learn how to do it.
To help the network with the task, it seems a reasonable idea to let
each unit activate when it could possibly explain the input, and quell
its activation in case another unit provides a stronger explanation
for it. We could say that the units compete for getting the honour of
representing the input. Knowing which units should compete can be
learnt, or the other way around, units that are hard-wired to compete
may automatically learn to represent conflicting explanations.
The competition can be performed by a special hard-wired layer
following a normal layer, which can also be seen as an activation
function that is not element-wise. A few feed-forward network
architectures do incorporate such hard-wired competition. For
example, in local winner-takes-all networks, every unit is paired
up with a neighbour, and the less active unit of each pair is always
muted 10. Some auto-encoder algorithms apply a form of competition,
10 Rupesh Srivastava, Jonathan Masci,
Sohrob Kazerounian, Faustino Gomez,
and Jürgen Schmidhuber (2013).
Compete to compute. In Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems,
pages 2310–2318
but then between all units, to enforce sparsity of the representation,
as noted in section §2.3.3. Also, the soft-max layer often used in
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the output of (supervised) classifier networks does hold a (soft)
competition to obtain the relative activities of units, but again the
competition happens between all units in the layer, and normally only
on the final layer.
Instead of letting the competition follow each layer as a kind of
activation function, another approach would be to apply a simple
form of recurrence, by adding inhibitory lateral connections between
units, essentially letting each unit’s activation threshold be influenced
by competing units’ activity. Inspiration for such an approach can
be drawn from the lateral inhibitory connections in the cortex. By
making the lateral connections learnable, it can be configured which
units compete, and competition could also be configured to be strong
or weak. Competition is very related to representation sparsity,
and lateral inhibitory connections may be a good way to enforce
sparsity. When choosing prior distributions, it may be worth looking
whether an Ising model with negative weights can be used rather
than distributions that reduce activities of units individually, like the
Laplace distribution.
Adding recurrent lateral connections does add the implied complexity
of recurrence, so processing becomes iterative since the initial activa-
tion of units will compel their neighbours to update their activation,
which again changes others’ inhibitions, and so forth. A possibly
interesting way to approximate or speed up the potentially endless
iterations is to first let the most strongly activated units inhibit their
competitors before continuing to process the others’ activations. This
idea is inspired by how in brains, neurons fire earlier when their
total received stimulus is stronger, because they integrate inputs until
the firing threshold is reached. Neurons firing much quicker might
inhibit their neighbours and could prevent them from reaching their
firing thresholds at all. Although in a network that is otherwise feed-
forward, it may be more attractive to add feed-forward competition,
competition through recurrence would not add much extra trouble if
we would be adding recurrence anyway; a plan that is discussed next.
5.4 Biasing competitions with expectations
Having lateral competition between units is only half a solution. If a
unit does not have enough information available to make the right
decision, it may be better to not make a decision at all, and give higher
layers vague information instead of wrong information.
Insight: Without sufficient information to make a decision, lateral
competition might be counterproductive.
67
The missing factor to perform Bayesian inference is the context-
dependent prior, that would tell what result is expected in the situa-
tion at hand. The complication is that knowing the current situation
requires interpreting the input, leading to a circular dependency:
“a major problem for vision systems is how to use low-level cues to
rapidly access the correct high-level models so as to quickly resolve the
low-level ambiguities”11
11 Alan Yuille et al. (2006)
Luckily, with only partial or uncertain interpretations it may already
be possible to get a rough idea of the situation, and use the model’s
knowledge to refine the interpretation further.
Since all units will then directly or indirectly depend on each other, a
recurrent network results in which units that face ambiguous input
may settle to their final state only after units above it have provided it
with enough context to choose the correct interpretation. The network
may be quite different from usual recurrent networks, since there
is a distinction between ascending and descending connections12.
12 In the most simple design, a learnt
weighted sum of the activations from
above would be added to the bias
of each unit, thus treating them just
like normal inputs from below. The
network design could however treat
downward and upward connections
differently, as is the case when using
predictive coding, see below.
This layered topology with functional asymmetry creates a structured
form of recurrence, and keeps the idea of having a hierarchy of layers
intact.
Insight: Most contemporary networks are either recurrent or
hierarchically structured, but the combination would make a lot of
sense.
Conveniently, the top-down connections can be exactly the ones that
define the generative model we are trying to invert. In the terminology
of vaes and approximate inference models of section §2.2.2, our
inference model q incorporates the structure and parameters of p. If the
generative model p would have been defined beforehand, these top-
down connections need not be changed when learning q. More likely
however, we will want to learn the generative model and inference
model simultaneously, and having them weaved together into one
recurrent network will enable us to use either to provide learning
signals for the other, as was the idea in the previous chapter, and will
be shortly returned to in the next.
Insight: The generative model could be defined only implicitly, by the
top-down connections in inference model.
5.4.1 Inference dynamics
When dealing with a generative model with several layers, inference
with both bottom-up and top-down signalling gets interesting. In the
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deep network, the iterative inference procedure operates throughout
the hierarchy, with each layer continuously conjecturing likely causes
(e.g. hl) for the input below, generating prior expectations for the
layer below (p (hl−1|hl)), getting a prior from above (p (hl |hl+1)) and
combining prior and likelihood to reinterpret its input from below
and update the previously hypothesised causes. With many messages
flowing up and down, there is quite some freedom in choosing in
which order the iterations proceed. One option is to proceed from
the bottom upwards to update each layer while sticking with the
previous prior, and then walking down again while updating the
priors to prepare for the next upward pass. However, it seems more
attractive to parallelise the updates and let each layer update their
values simultaneously.
Since the sketched inference process behaves like a dynamical system,
relevant questions are to which state it will converge, and whether it
actually stabilises at all. When each layer tries to produce the single
best (map) interpretation, the system may still get stuck in a stable
situation where a low level and a high level have settled to a locally
optimal state, and finding the global optimum would require both
layers to step away from their optimum. Even more interestingly,
in pathological situations, in particular when hypotheses with high
likelihood have a low prior expectation and vice versa, the system
might start oscillating between different states13. Both these problems
13 Interestingly, the brain appears to
alternate between interpretations when
given seemingly inconsistent input,
for example when showing each eye
a different (‘binocular rivalry’) (Andy
Clark, 2013).
seem strongly related to the chosen greedy approach where each
layer produces a single best hypothesis. To prevent this problem,
ideally the layers would express their full (conditional) probability
distributions, but that may be undoable. A possible solution is to
apply particle filtering, which means keeping multiple hypotheses
around at each layer and combining the information of two layers by
finding the best matching pairs of hypotheses:
“The only remedy that has been found in the computational literature
is not to jump to conclusions but to allow multiple high-probability
values for the features or hypotheses to stay alive until longer feedback
loops have had a chance to exert an influence.”14
14 Tai Sing Lee and David Mumford
(2003). Hierarchical bayesian inference
in the visual cortex. JOSA A, 20(7):1434–
1448Insight: Letting each layer search a single best value may hinder
finding the best collective interpretation.
Another important question is the speed of convergence of the
system. Iterative inference mechanisms may be powerful but can
be prohibitively slow. Interestingly, the time required to settle to an
interpretation may depend on the complexity of the image, which
may sound very natural to humans but is remarkably different from
the constant computation time of feed-forward networks. The speed
of convergence largely depends on design choices like the form of the
generative model and exactly how the layers update their values. One
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factor that could also help is to start with a good initial hypothesis,
which could perhaps be the resulting interpretation of a related datum;
the obvious example of this is discussed next.
5.4.2 Temporal data
The discussed iterative method of inference should still work if the
input is not a static value, but a stream of values that is presented one
by one. The activations of the previous time step can then be retained
to serve as the initial state for the next input, and inputs be fed in
at the same rate at which the activations are updated. Even though
this would imply that the input has already changed when the higher
levels have settled to a new interpretation, there are two effects at
play that should make things work nicely.
Firstly, higher-level layers will represent more abstract features that
will accordingly change more slowly. In a video, shapes, shadows
and positions may change, but a koala does not turn into a penguin
from one frame to the next. This property makes that the previously
inferred high-level representations can still be used to provide priors
for the next input15, allowing for a quick input processing unless
15 In fact, the high-level features may
be more abstract because they are less
volatile; see section §4.5.2.
significant changes occur suddenly. To better understand the method,
it may be helpful to regard the network as a configurable feed-forward
network, with higher layers tweaking the configuration of the lower
layers to adjust them for the current situation.
Insight: Higher-level features change more slowly, and the recurrent
inference network can be regarded as a feed-forward network that
continually reconfigures itself for the current situation.
The second helpful effect is that the network can learn to take the
progression of time into account. Rather than a static expectation
of the current input, the priors that are sent down will present a
prediction of what is expected in the subsequent input.
5.4.3 The case without feedback
Stepping back for a moment, we can again ask how networks manage
that are unable to read the context information from the layers above.
Intuitively, we obtain a situation similar to the case when competition
is lacking, discussed earlier: for optimal detection of their pattern, the
units will need to try to extract contextual hints from the input below
them, thereby conflating information about the prior of the features
with information about the likelihood of the features themselves. For
example, a unit trying to detect a koala in the center of view may
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attempt to look whether the area around it looks like a (eucalyptus)
tree. Although understandable and possibly helpful for inference,
conflating the two types of information at this level seems suboptimal
and may hamper generalisation, because it will have to use the lower-
level features.
It would be nice if tree-detecting units would be available below the
koala-unit, but the fundamental problem here is that there is no logical
order in which the features can be resolved: how probably the object
is a koala depends on whether it is on a eucalyptus tree, but also the
other way around, the treey stuff is more probably a eucalyptus tree
if the object on it is a koala. Or, thinking back to the earlier example,
each squiggle is more probably a letter when the squiggles around
them are letters too. In theory, a feed-forward network could in one
layer make a initial interpretation of the squiggles, and then refine
those in a subsequent layer by taking the initial interpretations of
the surrounding squiggles into account. Such an approach makes
a rough attempt at learning to compute what the iterations of the
network incorporating feedback would perform, but does so after
having unfolded the recurrent network and decoupled the shared
weights. Learning this way would be much harder because there are
many more weights and they have to be balanced properly.
5.5 Predictive coding
The discussed principle of using the generative model to bias competi-
tions between the units below comes close to the top-down processing
theories of the brain that were covered in section §3.4. However, one
important aspect of those theories that up to now has been ignored
in this chapter, is the idea that ascending connections need to convey
only that part of the information that was not already present in the
layer they report to. Put simply, a lower layer would send up only
those activations that do not match with the expectations it receives
through the descending connections. Using this method of predictive
coding in our inference model would intuitively make sense, because
for updating an interpretation, a higher layer mostly needs to know
what is wrongwith its interpretation, and hearing everything it already
expected to hear is merely a distraction from that.
hl
el
expectationprediction
hl+1
el+1
error
Figure 5.3: Predictive coding
introduces error units, which
report upwards only the
mismatch between the top-
down expectation and the
actual activations.
Besides biasing the units below, the generated expectations can thus
be used to filter the information that is sent up. The network required
for this can best be drawn as having two types of units: each usual
representation unit is hard-wired to an error unit (see figure 5.3). Al-
though predictive coding requires a structural change in the network
architecture, we will see that it fits nicely into the biased competition
framework we have been discussing above, because we had not yet
defined exactly how
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we only stated that it in some way bases on the activations from below
and the generated prior expectation from above. Before inspecting
how the two concepts fit together in section §5.6, we look at an
example and some thoughts about how predictive coding creates a
negative feedback loop that results in iterative inference in another
way than we discussed before.
5.5.1 Inference in sparse coding
It may be insightful to realise that the basic principle of predictive
coding appears naturally when straight-forwardly applying gradient
ascent optimisation to perform map inference in a simple generative
model, thus without using a separate approximate inference model.
To exemplify this, we derive this inference method for sparse coding
as defined in section 2.4.2, starting from the definition of its single-
layer generative model:
p (h) = ∏
i
λ
2
e−λ|h[i]|
p (x|h) = ∏
i
1√
π
e−(x−Ah)[i]
2
Performing map inference in this model is done by searching16:
16 See equation 2.2.
hˆ = argmax
h
p (h|x) = argmax
h
{log p (x|h) + log p (h)}
By taking the gradient of the objective in the accolades with respect
to h, we find the following rule for updating our hypothesis:
∆h ∝
∂ log p (x|h)
∂h
+
∂ log p (h)
∂h
=
∂∑i − (x− Ah)[i]2
∂h
− ∂∑i λ |h[i]|
∂h
= AT (x− Ah)− λ sign(h)
= ATe− λ sign(h)
Already from the first line can be seen that the update consists of
two parts, one due to the error e = x − Ah between the generated
expectation and the actual input, and one due to the sparsity prior.
It is also easy to see that this property does not only appear for
this particular choice of probability distributions, and variations of
the generating distribution p (X|h) may lead to the same network
structure but using a different computation for the error e (x, Ah)17.
17 At least when the generating
distribution is factorisable, and
p (x[i]|h) = f (x[i] , (Ah)[i]), for a
differentiable function f .
For the Gaussian distribution used here, the mismatch between
activation x and the expectation Ah is measured subtracting them,
while other distributions, for example a Bernoulli distribution for
binary activations, would lead to other measures for their mismatch.
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5.5.2 The power of negative feedback
The point of the above example is that predictive coding is quite a
natural approach to perform inference. An important property of the
just derived iterative inference procedure, in contrast to the encoder
of an auto-encoder, is that it indirectly creates a competition between
alternative explanations. Instead of units competing directly with
each other, predictive coding ensures that as soon as the emerging
interpretation provides an explanation for some part of the input, that
part is muted by the generated expectation and will thereby not cause
other explanations to activate.
Insight: Predictive coding creates an indirect competition between
explanations by silencing already explained parts of the input.
To understand predictive coding at a more abstract level, it may be
illustrative to observe the relation with a negative feedback amplifier
in electronics. In such a circuit, the output of an high-gain amplifier
is divided and fed back and subtracted from its input, so that only
the difference between the two values is amplified, and the output is
stable as soon as those values are equal. Although this approach may
seem devious, because it compensates for its own imperfections this
type of amplifier is in many ways superior to an amplifier without
negative feedback, whose inherent imperfections lead to distortions
in the output.
The intuition behind a negative feedback loop is that it evaluating
your mistakes and correcting for them is easier than computing the
right answer without looking back. Although the situation may be
more complex in neural networks than in most applications of control
theory, the important principle is that the error is made available as a
signal. The mapping from such an error signal to a desired activation
may be much simpler than a direct mapping from the original input
to that activation.
Insight: Prediction errors should be made signals, because measuring
how wrong the output is eases determining the correct output.
An unspoken assumption here is that although the mapping the
input to the right output is difficult, it is easy to check how far the
output is off. In electronics, dividing voltages is much easier than
multiplying them, so creating the inverse of an amplifier is a piece of
cake. The crucial question is now whether the same criterion holds for
applications of machine learning. If it is the case, as has been tacitly
assumed throughout this thesis, that an adequate directed generative
model of our data could be made, then to perform inference it seems
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sensible to let generation provide some kind of negative feedback to
the inference procedure.
Insight: If — and only if — validating the output is easier than
producing it, a feedback loop may be the solution.
5.6 Predictive coding + expectation bias
Having sufficiently evangelised about how predictive coding helps a
layer process its inputs from below, it is time to sketch how predictive
coding is combined with the earlier idea of using top-down contextual
information to decide between interpretations and disambiguate
inputs. Although the two principles are often taken together in
the brain theories, they are best understood separately. The network
in figure 5.3 does send down its expectations at every layer, but still
it does not create a continuing top-down path, so activations are not
able to use knowledge from the layers above it.
5.6.1 Combining the two
When adding in the idea of biased competitions, the expectation
received from above is used both to set the prior of the layer, and to
filter the information that is sent back up. These two functions fit
together very nicely. Intuitively, each representation unit tries to set
its activation as to match with the expectation it receives, but if this
would not be consistent with the input from below, its deviation from
the expected activation is reported upwards.
Insight: Error coding and disambiguation are two complementary uses
of top-down feedback.
To implement this idea in a network architecture, the representation
units need to receive a signal from above. To provide the biases to the
representation units, the error units can conveniently be reused, by
adding a connection back to the representation unit they accompany.
Biasing then boils down to encouraging each representation unit
directly to make the error sent up as small as possible, which allows
us to regard the whole network as being solely engaged in prediction
error reduction.
hl
el
expectationprediction
hl+1
el+1
error
bias
Figure 5.4: A bias makes the
representation units try to
minimise the error that is sent
upwards, thus trying to match
the expectation itself.
Insight: When combining predictive coding with expectation bias, the
goal of a unit is to minimise the error it receives from below, as well as
the error it sends up.
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Alternatively, the biasing connections could stem directly from the
representation units in the layer above, as was the idea in the previous
chapter. This approach provides an equivalent effect18, but a possible
18 Michael Spratling (2008). Reconciling
predictive coding and biased
competition models of cortical
function. Frontiers in Computational
Neuroscience, 2
downside is that two downward paths are made that would both
have to learn to generate expectations.
5.6.2 “Deep sparse coding”
Like in the sparse coding example above, we can see the described
network architecture appear naturally by deriving an inference
procedure in a generative model. In the single-layer model we studied
in that example, the hidden layer prior was fixed and centered around
zero, but it is easy to imagine that prior to instead be centered around
a value generated by a new layer h2 that is put on top. For simplicity
we could make this prior p (h1|h2) Gaussian19, while the new layer h2 19 A sparse prior around a non-zero
value makes little sense anyway. Note
that we fix the variance again to
σ2 = 1/2 so it disappears from the
equations.
would have a sparse prior. Inferring the value of h1 through gradient
ascent (assuming h2 fixed) would in that model lead to the following
iterative inference step:
∆h1 ∝
∂ log p (x|h1)
∂h1
+
∂ log p (h1)
∂h1
=
∂ log p (x|h1)
∂h1
+
∂ log p (h1|h2)
∂h1
=
∂∑i − (x− A1h1)[i]2
∂h1
+
∂∑i − (h1 − A2h2)[i]2
∂h1
= AT (x− Ah)− (h1 − A2h2)
= ATe0 − e1
This result matches exactly with the architecture we have been
describing, with the layer h1 getting two update signals that try
to reduce both the incoming prediction error e0 from below, and the
error e1 between its activation and the received prior expectation from
above. In fact, if we add one more layer to the model, the simple
case shown here turns out to be equivalent to the predictive coding
model experimented with by (Rajesh Rao et al., 1999), mentioned
earlier in section §3.4.2. Using Gaussian distributions and plain
linear generation may however not bring the most interesting models,
but choosing different types of generative models can lead to more
satisfying models that have a similar structure.
We could change the probability distribution to create sparsity in the
intermediate layers too, possibly by factorising the prior into a part
influenced by top-down generation, and a sparsity prior: p (h1|h2) =
ptd (h1|h2) ps (h1). In a way, the kind of model we are looking for
here could be seen as a logical extension of sparse coding to contain
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multiple layers. One more important aspect that would be helpful
for creating powerful models is to let layers not only generate the
particular value that they expect to see, but instead enable them to
express a whole range of values that would be expectable. This is the
next, and last, topic we look at in this chapter.
5.7 Heteroscedasticity
In the above, our generative model would always generate a single
expected value for each unit in the layer below, and a unit tries
to take a single value close to its received expectation. How far it
can deviate from that expected value was fixed by the hard-coded
variance of the chosen distribution. Because many types of data
are heteroschedastic, i.e., the variance of variables depends on other
latent variable values, it would be much better if the model can also
express levels of uncertainty, for example by individually computing
the variance of the prior distribution generated for each unit.
5.7.1 Uncertainty in expectations
The idea about generating not a single expected value but a wider
distribution of expectable values is also explained by David Mumford
(see section §3.4.1), who phrased the argument as “templates must
be flexible”20. Such flexibility gives a new type of power to the
20 David Mumford (1992). On the
computational architecture of the
neocortex: II. The role of cortico-
cortical loops. Biological cybernetics,
66(3):241–251
generative model. Imagine we are trying to generate our expectation
for the colour of an object, where we for now assume the value of
some single unit represents this colour. When the system is able to
assign a variance, or another measure of uncertainty, to its computed
expected value, for different animals we can have different amounts
of certainty about their colour, so expectations of a value can be made
precise (e.g. koalas are always grey/brownish), or can be deliberately
less specific (e.g. boats can be of any colour between red and blue).
When assuming Gaussian distributions with fixed variance, as is
quite commonly done for simplicity, the model is unable to model
uncertainty21. The generative model then has no way to express
21 Though, if not using (batch)
normalisation, the model could
perhaps play a bit with the scale of
values to adjust the relative amount of
the variance.
indifference about some units of a layer, so it always has to specify
an aspect in the same level of detail for every object. When using
predictive coding, each unit will always try to fit its value to that ex-
pectation, and error units will keep reporting mismatches needlessly.
The layer above will therefore have to represent the irrelevant details,
like the colour of a boat, in order to shush the reported errors.22
22 This reminds of the problem
described in section §1.5, about the
layers having trouble with dropping
details.
When given the ability to model variance, assigning a large variance
to the generated expectation for some representation unit practically
means that the gain of the corresponding error unit is lowered, so
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that both the reported error is diminished and the representation unit
is pressured less to be close to the expected value.
Insight: A generative model should be able to model not only
values but also variances, so it can choose which aspects it is fussy or
indifferent about.
5.7.2 Uncertainty in representations
Related to the ability to generate flexible expectations, a similarly
useful power would be the ability to model the uncertainty of
interpretations, which would be especially useful during an iterative
inference process. As discussed in section §5.4.1, when sending
signals up and down to combine evidence and knowledge, it would
be helpful to keep multiple hypotheses alive in order to not get stuck
in a local optimum. The idea of uncertain interpretations is a step
towards this idea, because if an interpretation can express uncertainty
about its value, it becomes more like a range of hypotheses instead of
a single best guess.
In an inference process, the hypothesis of a layer may initially be
very uncertain, so it would generate and send down a prior that also
contains uncertainty, thus telling the layer below that the context is
unknown and pretty much anything is expected. The (unproven)
intuition is that after a few iterations, the flow of signals up and down
makes that the hypotheses of layers become more specific, and if all
works out well they should converge towards the map value.
Insight: Modelling uncertainty in interpretations allows inference to
settle from a clueless hypothesis to a sharp value.
Another interesting idea that combines predictive coding with the
ability of setting the variance of expectations, is that an attention
mechanism could be implemented that can turn its focus to some
aspect of an input by assigning its expectations for that aspect a very
small variance. For the units that are attended, even small mismatches
from the expected value will then be reported upwards as errors23.
23 To be able to focus on an aspect
without forcing our expectation onto
it, perhaps predictive coding and
expectation bias should then not share
the same error unit, as was opted in
section §5.6.1
This principle has been suggested as a possible mechanism to explain
attention in the brain:
“attention might not be the ‘selection’ of sensory channels but an
emergent property of ‘prediction’; where high-precision prediction-
errors enjoy greater gain.”24
24 Karl Friston (2009). The free-energy
principle: a rough guide to the brain?
Trends in cognitive sciences, 13(7):293–
301
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5.7.3 Sparse representations as probability distributions
To be able to model not only values but also variances of both predic-
tions and representations, we do need to decide on an architecture
that has these capabilities. A possible solution is to use sparse binary
representations, which not only enables us to model variance, but
gets even a step closer to the more powerful capability of expressing
arbitrary probability distributions.
The idea of sparse binary representations is that every would-be
continuous variable is now discretised, and every possible value
it could take is represented by a separate unit that competes for
activation with the others, not unlike in a one-hot encoding. This
approach of using a separate unit for each value allows to express
uncertainty in representations, because several units can be turned on
at once if the exact value is not known25. Although the representation
25 To allow multiple values to be active,
the competition should not enforce
the one-hot encoding. In contrast, we
could regard a continuous-valued unit
as holding a super-strict competition
between its possible values, because
only one out of many possible values
can be the outcome.
is made of binary variables, the units that implement it are still
continuous, and their level of activation now corresponds to the
probability of their binary variable being turned on.
Insight: Sparse representations are very suitable for expressing
probability distributions.
Sparse representations likewise support generating flexible expecta-
tions. Instead of supplying an expected value and its variance to
some continuous variable, the top-down signal now tells for each unit
whether its value is within the expected range or not, or (between
those two options) exactly how (un)expected their activation would
be26. In order to make this idea work, we do need to change
26 To prevent massive over-fitting,
perhaps we are able to use excitatory
lateral connections to by default group
multiple values.
the way we treat about the expected value sent to a unit. In the
predictive coding approaches covered so far, we would have each unit
report its deviation from the expected value, possibly divided by the
expectation’s variance. However, in the new approach, a generated
expectation reports to a range of units that any of them is expected to
be active, but not all of them, so units that fall within the expected
range but are not active should not start reporting an error because
their inactivation does not match the received expectation. In other
words:
Insight: In sparse representations we need ‘asymmetric’ error
reporting, to report unexpected activity but not unexpected inactivity.
In terms of probability distributions, this could be achieved by letting
the prior distribution that is sent down to a unit not be centered
around the computed (expected) value, but to range from zero up
to that value, so that a weaker activation is acceptable too. In an
implementation, things may be as simple as letting the top-down
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signals inhibit error units when their activation is expected. To still be
able to require a unit to be inactive, a solution could be to add units
with complementary activations.
6Synthesis
In the course of this thesis, we have studied how to form abstract data
representations by learning directed generative models (chapter 1),
reviewed typical neural network algorithms that implement this way
of learning (chapter 2), and drawn inspiration from theories about
bidirectional signalling in the brain (chapter 3) in order to investigate
alternative ways to learn network weights (chapter 4), as well as ways
to more accurately infer the representation of given data (chapter 5).
To round off this thesis, we look how these explored ways of learning
and inference fit together, to briefly sketch the outline of a network
architecture and learning method that could be used to guide further
research and experiments.
6.1 Unifying learning and inference
In chapter 4, the line of thought was that instead of accompanying
both computational paths (inference and generation) with an op-
posing path through which gradients are back-propagated from an
objective defined at the very end, we could create learning rules that
determine helpful weight updates based on the information that is
made locally available via the already existing paths. The inference
model listens to the feedback it receives from the generative model,
and vice versa, to determine how it can be more useful. From the
ideas of target propagation and recirculation, a useful perspective we
discovered was to regard the generative model to be reusing the same
units that the inference model uses, together forming a recurrent
network in which a unit’s weight update can be derived simply by
comparing its activation and inputs before and after the influence
of top-down feedback. If the unit’s new values would come from
the actual Bayesian posterior of the generative model, they would be
ideal to use as target outputs for the units’ input.
This last idea fits together remarkably well with the idea of chapter 5,
80
in which the goal was to make the inference model more capable of
approximating Bayesian inference by incorporating the generative
model into the inference network architecture. Each layer would
generate expectations to change the bias for units below and filter
out already expected activity, thereby creating feedback loops and
turning inference into an iterative process that gradually forms its
best interpretation.
These approaches to learning and to inference look like they were
made for each other1: For local learning from temporal differences in
1 This of course is the reason both are
treated in the same thesis.activation, we wanted the feedback loop to give each unit a justifiably
better value that can be used as its target value, and iterative inference
provides exactly that. The other way around, iterative inference would
be very hard to train by back-propagating through all iterations, and
learning by local update rules may be a possible solution because the
feedback loops could already provide all information that is needed
for choosing a good update direction.
The combination of the ideas boils down to an algorithm that, given
a datum, forms an initial interpretation in a feed-forward pass, then
starts using the feedback loop to refine the interpretation and settle
to an optimum, after which the weights are adjusted so that for a
similar future input, the initial interpretation will already be closer
to the ultimate refined value, and inference will be expedited. The
paradigm can be considered an amortised inference approach in
which the network provides its own truth value, so that next time
it will converge faster to whatever value it will converge to now.
Although this may sound circular and potentially only worsening its
weights, the hypothesis here is that by incorporating the generative
model in the inference network and hard-wiring the predictive coding
principle into its architecture, learning by using future values as
targets will work out fine.
Insight: In a network that gradually improves its interpretation, the
future value of a unit is a good target value for its current input.
Another important point to take into account here is that the gen-
erative model is not static or predefined. Instead of saying that
the inference network incorporates the generative model, we could
say that its top-down connections define it. The generative model
is learnt simultaneously with the inference network, and it can be
learnt in pretty much the same way: having inferred the optimal
interpretation, the probability to generate the current input below
from that interpretation should be increased. We could also look at it
from the perspective of the inference process, and say that we update
the weights such that the current input should be expected in the
currently represented situation.
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The just described way of learning is similar to the normal sparse
coding learning algorithm described in section §2.4, but now per-
formed at every layer in the deep network, and is even more similar
to the learning method used in the predictive coding algorithm of
Rajesh Rao and Dana Ballard2. In the predictive coding architecture,
2 Rajesh Rao and Dana Ballard (1999).
Predictive coding in the visual cortex:
a functional interpretation of some
extra-classical receptive-field effects.
Nature neuroscience, 2(1):79–87
the learning rules for both types of units turn out to be simple and
(anti-)Hebbian, which gives them an elegant, intuitive explanation:
Insight: Representation units learn to predict their own state of
activation and try to reach it faster next time. Error units learn to
predict their own activation from signals from above, and try to prevent
themselves from firing in the future.
6.2 Further research
The generality with which the methods and ideas have been described
in this thesis makes that getting to a concrete implementation still
requires a lot of work, and it may take many trials to find a working
approach among the many possible manifestations. A rough outline
of the type of architecture has been sketched, but there is still a huge
amount of freedom regarding which pieces and principles to select
and how to configure them. There are too many aspects that need
further thinking and experimentation to list them all.
Some exploratory experiments that may be worth a try could be done
by digging up some of the previous work that has been referred to,
and look if tweaking their approaches leads anywhere. For example,
the predictive coding implementation of Rajesh Rao et al. (1999) could
be an interesting place to start. The work on amortised inference by
Karol Gregor et al. (2010) may be another such work, and perhaps
modifying either work in the direction of the other could give an
impression of the viability of the combination of these ideas.
Although the idea in this thesis is that the learning algorithm would
best be designed along with the inference procedure, the principles
of some architectural aspects could already be tested with generic
optimisation methods. A few possible experiments that come to mind
are to create learnable lateral competition in auto-encoder inference
networks, to model variance in methods that normally use fixed-
variance Gaussians, and to try what happens when a hierarchical
recurrent network with both ascending and descending connections
is trained (with back-propagation through time) to produce the true
posterior of a known generative model. It would be interesting to see
if the latter would learn to perform predictive coding.
Besides trying to work out the principles that have been described,
an important task is to question the principles themselves. Many
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assumptions have been made, and discovery of their falsehood
would undermine the conclusions that have been drawn. One such
assumption used throughout this thesis is that we want to learn a
directed generative model, while perhaps that might not even be so
useful. We assumed we want to perform inference in this generative
model in order to interpret inputs. It could be questioned whether
this is really that important. Bayesian inference is not a goal on
itself and may be an intractably difficult task, while for any kind of
intelligent system we may desire to build, what we would actually
need is Bayesian decision making: a brain or computer needs to
extract information from its surroundings that is relevant for deciding
its actions, and inference is only useful in so far as it is required for
making decisions. Another question is to what extent the concepts are
capable of performing more abstract information processing 3, where
3 Maybe thinking is the right word here
attention and more complex reasoning mechanisms are required.
Probably at some level the hierarchy of abstraction that makes sense
for the interpretation of low-level data has to make place for a less
structured mesh of associations, like it also seems to be the case in
the correspondingly named association areas of the neocortex.
6.3 Conclusion
The main goal of this thesis was to explore ways to improve unsuper-
vised deep learning, while drawing inspiration from theories about
the brain and looking at existing and past work in this direction that
could be worth revisiting. Many well thought-through ideas have
been proposed and tried over the last few decades, and some may
lead to successful results when properly implemented and mixed into
modern methods and technology.
The general direction has been to move away from feed-forward
networks trained with end-to-end back-propagation. Instead, the
intention is to move towards methods that could be considered deep
sparse coding structure, with learnt iterative inference procedures that
are able to approximate Bayesian inference, while locally available
information is used to at each layer to improve the generative model
and learn to speed up the inference process.
Perhaps more important than the particular techniques that have
been suggested, is the way of thinking about them. The implicitly
advocated way of doing research is to reason about the algorithm
design and study fundamental principles of learning, rather than to
tweak some parts of a well-performing algorithm and hoping to beat
a benchmark score by a few permille. Quite some research, including
that in academia, seems to have a tendency towards the latter
approach, but while we are still in the stone age of machine learning,
focussing on accuracy rates feels like premature optimisation.
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